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ABSTRACT 
 
The main subjective of this dissertation is to analyze three issues of current interest in 
agricultural economics. Chapter 1 investigates the lead-lag relationships among soybean prices 
in U.S., Brazilian, and Chinese futures markets by using threshold co-integration 
methodologies. The empirical results indicate the influence of U.S. market in the long-term, 
and also show that overnight return of U.S. soybean futures and the daytime return of Chinese 
No. 1 soybean futures contemporaneously affect each other in the short-term. A weak temporal 
seasonal causality between U.S. and Brazilian soybean futures prices exists. Chapter 2 
examines the impact of feedstock supply mechanisms under conditions of spatial monopoly on 
the supply of cellulose to the plants. The model shows that, in the absence of competition, the 
processor is indifferent between processor collection and supplier delivery, but that societal 
welfare is higher under supplier delivery. By using a repeated Nash Equilibrium, this paper 
shows that processor collection is first best for both incumbent and entrant. By comparing the 
slope of marginal cost curve for this monopsonistic processor with the slope of cost curve 
across other feedstocks, substantial quantities of other feedstocks may be required to meet the 
mandate. Chapter 3 investigates a change in the market power of the U.S. nitrogen fertilizer 
industry by examining the causal linkage between fertilizer, its main feedstock (natural gas), 
and output (corn) by using a Bayesian-based Kalman filter algorithm. The results of the time-
varying estimation show that the U.S. nitrogen fertilizer price follows the value of its marginal 
productivity closer than its marginal cost of production, indicating a less competitive market 
structure. The estimation from the error correction model supports these results. 
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CHAPTER 1. PRICE DISCOVERY ON INTERNATIONAL 
SOYBEAN FUTURES MARKETS: A THRESHOLD CO-
INTEGRATION APPROACH 
Abstract 
        This paper investigates the lead-lag relationships among soybean prices in U.S., Brazilian, 
and Chinese futures markets. We focus on both long-run price co-movements and on short-run 
price relationships. Various co-integration methodologies and causality tests are applied to 
examine the changes in price relationships over time. The empirical results indicate the 
following: (a) the soybean futures market in the U.S. is still the most important and influential 
market, and the U.S. price, in the long-term, leads price changes in Brazil and China; (b) in the 
short-term, the overnight return of U.S. soybean futures and the daytime return of Chinese No. 
1 soybean futures contemporaneously affect each other, but there is no significant causality 
between U.S. overnight return and the daytime return of Chinese No. 2 soybean futures; and, 
(c) a weak temporal seasonal causality between U.S. and Brazilian soybean futures price exists 
and more often than not Brazilian futures lead U.S. futures during the Brazilian growing 
season.  
1.1 Introduction 
        The U.S., Brazil, and Argentina account for over 90% of the world’s soybean exports. 
China, which imported 71.4 million tons of soybeans in 2014, is by far the largest importer and 
gets approximately 50% of its soybeans from the U.S. and 40% from Brazil.  
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        The U.S., Brazil, and China all have active soybean futures. China has two different 
markets, one for non-GMO soybeans and the other for imported GMO soybeans. In the Dalian 
Commodity Exchange (DCE), the No. 1 contact is for non-GMO soybeans that are used for 
human consumption, and the No. 2 contract allows delivery of imported GMO soybean crops, 
which are used for soy oil and animal feed. Figure 1.1 shows soybean futures prices in all four 
markets. There is visual evidence of strong co-movements among these prices, and we 
investigate whether this co-movement is due to a stable long-run price relationship and 
examine the price lead-lag relationship across the four markets.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Soybean futures prices in the US, Brazil and China from 2005 to 2015 
 
        This paper is the first to investigate the long-run lead-lag relationship among the U.S., 
Brazilian, and Chinese markets, and explores the seasonal relationship between U.S. and 
Brazilian futures markets and the influence the Globex overnight trading platform in the U.S. 
0
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1500
2000
2500 US BR CH1 CH2
3 
 
has on the daytime return of soybean futures in China.1 Overnight trading in the U.S. and 
daytime trading in China occur contemporaneously, so we apply an autoregressive distributed-
lag model to address this problem.  
        The paper is organized as follows: Section 1.1.1 provides a brief literature review. Section 
1.2 describes the methodology that characterizes the price lead-lag relationships using linear 
and non-linear co-integration. Section 1.3 describes the data. Section 1.4 exhibits and explains 
empirical results of co-integration and demonstrates two short-run causality relationships. 
Section 1.5 presents conclusions. 
1.1.1 Previous Theoretical Work 
        Granger (1981) introduced the most widely used methodology to study long-run price 
causality co-integration. He showed that two variables may have a long-run equilibrium 
relationship even if they are non-stationary. Engle and Granger (1987) extended this concept 
and showed that co-integrated variables can be represented by a vector error correction model 
(VECM) and provided test methodology for this framework. Balke and Fomby (1997) 
introduced the threshold concept to explain possible non-linear long-run equilibrium 
relationships. Hansen and Seo (2002) and Seo (2006) provided two methods to test a threshold 
and a method to estimate the parameters of a threshold vector error correction model 
(TVECM). 
        Wahab and Lashgari (1993) and Ghosh (1993) investigated the forecasting power of the 
S&P 500 index spot and futures prices changes using co-integration. Their results indicated a 
                                                 
1 Globex is the electronic trading system in the U.S. 
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stable long-run equilibrium relationship between the index and its futures price. Chu et al. 
(1999) investigated the price discovery function in three S&P 500 index markets: the spot 
index, index futures and S&P Depositary Receipts markets. They found that the three price 
series are a co-integrated system with one long-run stochastic trend and the futures market 
serves the dominant price discovery function when the common stochastic trend is 
decomposed. Martens et al. (1998) applied a threshold error correction model to study index-
futures arbitrage and found that the impact of futures market on the spot market is larger when 
the mispricing error is negative and that the impact of the mispricing error increases with the 
magnitude of that error.  
        Booth, Brockman, and Tse (1998) investigated the relationship between U.S. and 
Canadian wheat futures prices and showed that both of them are integrated of order one and 
that they are co-integrated. Fung et al. (2013) used daily data for 16 commodity futures 
contracts traded in China and the corresponding foreign markets to analyze price linkages 
among markets. They also studied the impact of Chinese futures daytime returns on the U.S. 
overnight returns using a regression of one return on the other; however, their study ignored 
the effect of the previous return on the current return. For soybeans, their results showed that 
the price causality between U.S. soybean futures contracts and both Chinese No. 1 and No. 2 
contracts are statistically significant but not economically significant. Peri and Baldi (2010) 
employed the threshold co-integration approach to analyze the long-run relationship between 
vegetable oil prices and conventional diesel prices in the EU and suggested a two-regime 
threshold co-integration relationship for the rapeseed oil and diesel price pair. Natanelov et al. 
(2011) examined price linkages between crude oil futures and a series of agricultural 
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commodities futures using the VECM method and showed that co-movement of commodity 
prices is a temporal seasonal concept and should be treated accordingly. 
        In the literature regarding soybean futures price discovery between U.S., Brazilian, and 
Chinese markets, Han et al. (2013) examined the role that the DCE plays in the global 
discovery of soybean futures. They used a structural vector autoregressive model (SVAR) and 
VECM on the returns of the DCE and the CBOT soybean futures during trading and non-
trading hours. The results indicate a bi-directional causality between the two markets with the 
CBOT leading the DCE. Han et al. did not include the Chinese No. 2 soybean futures contract 
due to a liquidity problem. Our paper employs more recent data to capture the role of Chinese 
No. 2 contracts and focuses on threshold co-integration analysis. Han et al. used a different 
approach than the one described below when rolling the price data when the nearby contract 
expires. This may help explain the difference between the results presented in this paper and 
those in Han et al. (2013). Christofoletti et al. (2012) examined the price linkage between 
soybean futures contracts in China, U.S., Brazil, and Argentina using VECM. The results 
indicated that the U.S. price has a dominant role. Liu et al. (2015) used a generalized 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model based on generalized error 
distribution (GED) and exponential GARCH-GED models and found that the spillover from 
CBOT soybean futures to DCE No. 1 soybean futures has weakened through time, indicating 
a more influential Chinese soybean market. Merener (2015) investigated how local supply 
shocks in the globally distributed production of commodities are incorporated into CME 
futures prices and found that CME soybean futures prices have become increasingly sensitive 
to supply shocks outside of the United States. 
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1.2 Theoretical Issues 
1.2.1 Co-Integration and the Vector Error Correction Model 
        In time-series econometrics, a price series that has a stationary, invertible, ARMA 
representation after differencing d  times, is said to be integrated of order d , denoted by 
( )tp I d . If both series tx  and ty  are ( )I d  processes, their linear combination t t tx yε β= −  
is also an ( )I d  process. However, if there exists a vector, [1, ]β− , such that ( )t I d bε − , 
where 0b > , then these two series are said to be co-integrated and the vector [1, ]β−  is called 
the co-integrating vector. In appendices A1-A3, two types of unit root tests indicate that all 
futures prices studied in this paper can be characterized as (1)I  processes. Therefore, we 
concentrate our study on the case when 1d b= = . As a result, the co-integrated system can be 
simply characterized as a VECM 
                                          
1
k
t t k t k t
i
x x A x vµ −
=
∆ = +Γ + ∆ +∑                                                     (1.1) 
where tx  is a 1n×  vector of (1)I  processes, µ  is a 1n×  vector of constant, Γ and kA are n n×  
coefficient matrices, and tv  is a 1n×  vector of Gaussian white noise processes. Johansen 
(1988; 1991) demonstrated that the rank of matrix Γ represented the number of co-integration 
relationships in vector tx . Thus, Johansen’s co-integration test estimates matrix Γ  through an 
unrestricted VAR and tests possible rejection of the restriction implied by the reduced rank of 
Γ . There are two test statistics, one using the trace and the other using the maximum 
eigenvalue, and inferences can be different.  
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        The null hypothesis for the trace test is that the number of co-integrating vectors is less 
than or equal to r . The test statistic is given by  
 
2
1
ln(1 )
n
itrace
i r
Tλ λ
= +
= − −∑  
where T  is the sample size actually used for estimation and iλ  is the estimated values of the 
ordered eigenvalues from the estimated matrix. For the maximum eigenvalue test, the test 
statistic is given by  
                                                        1max ln(1 )rTλ λ += − −  
which tests the null hypothesis that the number of co-integrating vectors is exactly r  against 
the alternative of 1r +  co-integrating vectors. 
        When there is a co-integration relationship between time series, Granger causality can be 
tested by a Wald test. Specifically, a linear VECM of order 1r +  can be compactly represented 
as 
                                                      1' ( )t t tx A X vβ−∆ = +                                                        (1.2) 
with 
1
1
1
2
1
( )
( )
t
t
t
t
t r
w
x
X
x
x
β
β
−
−
−
−
−
 
 
 
 ∆
=  
∆ 
 
  ∆ 

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where tx  is a n-dimensional (1)I  time series, which is co-integrated with one 1n×  co-
integrating vector β , 1( ) 't tw xβ β −=  is the error correction term (ECT), and 
( )1 2' rA A A Aµ α=    is a ( 2)n nr× +  matrix of coefficients.  
        Thus, the bi-variate co-integrated time series can be written as 
                            1, 1, 1,1 1 1
12, 2, 2,2 2
( )
r
t t i t
t i
it t i t
x x v
w A
x x v
µ α
β
µ α
−
−
= −
∆ ∆        
= + + +        ∆ ∆        
∑                               (1.3) 
where 1 1, 1 2, 1( )t t tw x xβ β− − −= −  determines the ECT. The optimal length of lag r  is determined 
by Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) or Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). 
        Intuitively, parameter iα  measures the long-run causality relationship and parameter β  
characterizes the long-run equilibrium between these two series. By testing the null hypothesis 
of 0iα =  against the alternative of 0iα ≠ , three different results may be obtained: (a) 1 0α =  
and 2 0α = ; (b) 1 0α ≠  and 2 0α ≠ ; and (c) 0iα ≠  but 0jα = . The first case indicates no co-
integration exists, the second case indicates bi-directional long-run causality, and the last case 
indicates a unidirectional long-run causality relationship. 
1.2.2 Threshold Co-Integration 
        The above traditional VECM assumes the adjustment process to the long-run equilibrium 
is continuous and linear. In reality, the influence of transaction costs, adjustment costs, or other 
market frictions makes it likely that movement toward the long-run equilibrium may only occur 
when the deviation from equilibrium exceeds a critical threshold level. It is also possible that 
the speed at which the system returns to long-run equilibrium differs under regimes. Balke and 
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Fomby (1997) introduced the concept of threshold co-integration to analyze this type of 
discrete adjustment process. 
        As an extension of model (1.2), we propose the following specification of a two-regime 
threshold co-integration model: 
                                     
'
1 1 1
'
2 1 1
( ) , if  | ( ) |
( ) , if  | ( ) |
t t t
t
t t t
A X v w
x
A X v w
β β γ
β β γ
− −
− −
 + ≤
∆ = 
+ >
                                             (1.4) 
where one regime is close to the equilibrium regardless of the sign of ECT and the other regime 
is far from the equilibrium, and γ  is the threshold parameter. Equation (4) can be rewritten as  
                                    ' '1 1 1 2 1 2( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )t t t t t tx A X d A X d vβ β γ β β γ− −∆ = + +                            (1.5) 
with 1 1( , ) 1(| | )t td wβ γ γ−= ≤ , 2 1( , ) 1(| | )t td wβ γ γ−= > . The coefficient matrices 1A  and 2A  
determine the dynamics in each regime. The advantage of this specification captures the idea 
that adjustment speed to long-run equilibrium would be lower when the deviation is banded. 
With the absolute value of 1tw −  above or below the critical threshold value, this TVECM model 
allows all coefficients, except the co-integrating vector, β , to switch between two regimes. 
The estimated coefficients of 1tw −  measure different adjustment speeds of price moving back 
towards the long-run equilibrium. 
        The hypothesis test for threshold co-integration involves four different cases: (a) co-
integration with no threshold effect; (b) co-integration with a threshold effect; (c) no co-
integration with a threshold effect; (d) no co-integration and no threshold effect. Thus, given 
the bi-variate Johansen co-integration test results, we apply two kinds of threshold tests, 
developed by Hansen and Seo (2002) and Seo (2006). 
10 
 
        If two series have shown a co-integration relationship using Johansen’s co-integration 
test, we further determine whether or not this co-integration is linear using the maximum 
likelihood method developed by Hansen and Seo (2002), which involves a joint grid search 
over the co-integrating vector β  in the region [ , ]L Uβ β  and a threshold parameter γ  in the 
region [ , ]L Uγ γ . In our empirical applications, we set the number of grid searches for both 
threshold parameter and co-integrating vector at 300.  
       Since the threshold effect is only valid when 10 (| | ) 1tP w γ−< ≤ < 2, it is imposed by 
assuming that  
        0 1 0(| | ) 1tP wπ γ π−≤ ≤ ≤ −  
where 0 0π >  is a trimming parameter and set equal to 0.05. 
         Hanson and Seo (2002) test the null hypothesis of linear co-integration (no threshold 
effect) against the alternative hypothesis of threshold co-integration by developing two SupLM 
tests for a given or estimated β  using a parametric bootstrap method to calculate asymptotic 
p-value. The first test is used when the true co-integrating vector 0β  is known to be a priori 
and the test statistic is denoted as   
 
0
0
[ , ]
SupLM sup ( , )
L U
LM
γ γ γ
β γ
∈
=
 
The second test is used when the true co-integrating vector is unknown and the test statistic is 
denoted as  
                                                 
2 Otherwise, the model reduces to a linear co-integration model. 
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         0
[ , ]
SupLM sup ( , )
L U
LM
γ γ γ
β γ
∈
=  
where β  is the null estimate of the co-integrating vector. 
        If two series fail to show a co-integration relationship by Johansen’s co-integration test, 
we alternatively apply a supreme test developed by Seo (2006). This tests the null hypothesis 
of no co-integration against the alternative hypothesis of threshold co-integration using a Band-
TVECM, 
            1 1 1 2 1 1( ) 1(| | ) 1(| | )t t t t t tL x w w w w vµ α γ α γ− − − −Φ ∆ = + ≤ + > +  
where 1,...,t n= , and ( )LΦ  is a th-orderq polynomial in the lag operator defined as 
1
1( )
q
qL I L LΦ = −Φ − −Φ . When threshold parameter γ  is fixed, the least-squares 
estimators for the coefficients are the OLS estimators. Thus, equation (1.5) can be specified as 
                            1 1 1 2 1 2
1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , )
        ( ) ( ) ( )
t t t t t
t q t q t
x w d w d
x x v
µ γ α γ β β γ α γ β β γ
γ γ γ
− −
− −
∆ = + +
+Φ ∆ + +Φ ∆ +
    
and the supreme Wald test statistic is defined as  
 
[ , ]
Sup sup ( )
L U
nW W
γ γ γ
γ
∈
=  
where nW  is the Wald statistic from testing the null of no co-integration with a fixed threshold 
parameterγ . 
1.2.3 Autoregressive Distributed-Lag Model 
        To study the temporal causal effect of soybean futures prices among different markets, 
we employ an autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL). Specifically, the autoregressive 
distributed lag model of order p and q , ARDL( , )p q , defined as follows: 
12 
 
    
1 0
p q
t k t k k t k t
k k
y c a y b x ε− −
= =
= + + +∑ ∑  
where ty  and tx  are stationary variables, and tε  is white noise. More strictly, we assume that 
tε  is stationary and independent of 1, ,t tx x − and 1, ,t ty y −  , so that this ARDL model can be 
estimated consistently using ordinary least squares. The estimated contemporaneous parameter 
coefficient 0b  is the impact multiplier that characterizes the temporal price relationships. 
1.3 Data Description and Timelines 
       Our empirical analysis uses daily nominal prices of soybean futures contracts traded in the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), the Dalian Commodity Exchange (DCE) and the 
Brazilian Mercantile and Futures Exchange (BM&F). All data is collected from a Bloomberg 
terminal, and the date range is from 03/01/2005 to 06/30/2015. A close-to-maturity method is 
employed to rollover data across contracts and all data is proportionally modified to eliminate 
the price jump across contracts.  
        Owing to differences in national holidays, data in all three markets are not automatically 
matched. We have eliminated mismatched data and the whole sample size is reduced to 2377 
observations. We standardize the price quotation unit and convert all prices into the natural log 
of prices measured in U.S. cents per bushel. 
        The Chinese futures market is open from 9:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 
3:00 p.m. The trading hours in Brazil are from 9:00 a.m. to 3:15 p.m. The trading floor in the 
U.S. operates from 8:30 a.m. to 1:15 p.m., and the Globex overnight trading runs from 7:00 
p.m. to 7:45 a.m. Figure 1.2 illustrates the timeline of these trading hours.  
13 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Timeline of the U.S., Brazilian, and Chinese futures markets 
 
        China is 13 hours ahead of the U.S. during the U.S. daylight saving period and 14 hours 
ahead during standard time. During daylight saving time, the Chinese market and U.S. Globex 
open at the same time, and the Chinese market closes 6.75 hours earlier than the Globex. 
During standard time, the Chinese market opens one hour later than U.S. and closes 5.75 hours 
earlier than the Globex. In other words, the Globex is always open when the Chinese market 
is open. Therefore, we do not need to adjust the data for this time change. The difference in 
daylight periods between the U.S. and Brazil does not impact the close-to-close return in each 
trading day in either market. Therefore, we do not need to account for the effect of daylight 
saving time in the empirical work.      
        In the following empirical applications, we focus on the close-to-close returns of soybean 
futures in each market, the open-to-close (daytime) returns of soybeans futures in the Chinese 
market, and the overnight return of soybean futures in the U.S. market. Detailed variable 
notations are provided in the appendix. 
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1.4 Empirical Results 
1.4.1 Long-Run Lead-Lag Relationship 
       Here, we present results pertaining to the long-run causality relationship between soybean 
futures prices in the three examined markets. Given the stationary test results in appendices, 
all closing prices can be regarded as an (1)I  process in every sub-period. Thus, we apply the 
Johansen co-integration test to investigate whether there is a long-run linear relationship 
between the closing prices in each market. As shown in figure 1.1, the co-movements among 
the price series are quite strong from the beginning of the data period, but the relationship 
weakens after several years, suggesting a structural break in the relationship. 
        The traditional approach to test structural change would be picking an arbitrary sample 
breakpoint, often the midpoint of the sample, and using Chow’s (1960) F-test. The result using 
this approach is very sensitive to the prior choice of break dates, and Hansen (2001) suggests 
that the Quandt-Likelihood Ratio (QLR) test is superior for detecting structural change with 
unknown timing. In our analysis, we are interested in whether the U.S. soybean futures market 
is still a world price leader, and we concentrate on the bi-variate causality relationship between 
soybean futures prices in the U.S. and elsewhere. Therefore, we employ this QLR structural 
change test and divide every pair-wise data sample into two sub-periods based on the test 
results. The results suggest that in July 2012 a structural break between soybean futures prices 
in the U.S. and Brazil occurred. Also, in October 2008 a structural break between the U.S. and 
Chinese No. 1 contracts occurred, and in August 2009 a structural break between U.S. and 
Chinese No. 2 contracts occurred as well. 
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       Table 1.1 reports trace statistics ( )traceλ  and maximum eigenvalue statistics max( )λ  from 
the bi-variate Johansen test for each sub-period of the sample, and shows that a linear co-
integration relationship between U.S. and Chinese No. 1 contracts does not exist in any period. 
Our result contradicts with Han et al. (2013) finding co-integration between U.S. and Chinese 
No. 1 contracts. A difference in data sample and modification approach may help explain the 
difference between the results in our paper and those in Han et al. (2013)—we employ more 
recent data to capture the price relationship and we proportionally modify futures prices to 
eliminate the influence of price jump across contracts when rolling price data when the nearby 
contract expires.  
        The underlying commodity for the Chinese No. 1 contract is non-GMO soybeans destined 
to be used for food. The underlying commodity for the U.S. and Chinese No. 2 contracts 
potentially contain GMO soybeans. Intuitively, the price relationship between U.S. and 
Chinese No. 2 soybean futures should be much closer than that between U.S. and Chinese No. 
1 futures contracts. This is shown in panel C of table 1.1 with a co-integrating relationship 
prior to 2009 and for the entire period. The co-integration relationship also exists between the 
U.S. and Brazil.   
Table 1.1: Bi-variate Johansen co-integration tests 
Panel A: U.S. and Brazil soybean futures contract 
 
03/01/2005-07/31/2012 08/01/2012-05/30/2015 03/01/2005-06/30/2015 
traceλ  maxλ  traceλ  maxλ  traceλ  maxλ  
0r =  19.91** 19.41*** 9.96 7.83 26.03*** 22.92*** 
1r ≤  0.50 0.50 2.12 2.12 3.11 3.11 
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Table 1.1 continued 
Analysis Co-integrated Not co-integrated Co-integrated 
Panel B: U.S. and Chinese No. 1 soybean futures contract 
 
03/01/2005-10/31/2008 11/01/2008-06/30/2015 03/01/2005-06/30/2015 
traceλ  maxλ  traceλ  maxλ  traceλ  maxλ  
0r =   10.41 10.21 12.38 8.20 13.55 10.97 
1r ≤  0.19 10.21 4.18 4.18 2.58 2.58 
Analysis Not co-integrated Not co-integrated Not co-integrated 
Panel C: U.S. and Chinese No. 2 soybean futures contract 
 
03/01/2005-08/31/2009 09/01/2009-06/30/2015 03/01/2005-06/30/2015 
traceλ  maxλ  traceλ  maxλ  traceλ  maxλ  
0r =  20.32** 19.83*** 10.28 9.25 26.74*** 24.03*** 
1r ≤  0.48 0.48 1.03 1.03 2.71 2.71 
Analysis Co-integrated Not co-integrated Co-integrated 
The VAR specification is estimated by applying up to 12 lags. The optimal lag length is 
determined by means of Schwarz information criterion (SIC). *,**,*** denotes statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
        In order to find the direction of long-run lead-lag relationships, we apply a weak 
exogeneity test to the co-integrating pairs of prices. Table II shows the results of these tests. 
Parameter α  in table 1.2 characterizes the long-run causality relationship in equation (3). 
When soybean futures price in Brazil is treated as the dependent variable, α  is significantly 
positive. This suggests that U.S. soybean futures price leads the price in Brazil. For the prices 
of U.S. and Chinese No. 2 futures contracts, the test results indicate a bi-directional causality 
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relationship, implying the soybean futures prices in U.S. and Chinese No. 2 contracts are 
influenced by each other. 
Table 1.2: Weak exogeneity test for co-integrated price pairs 
Panel A: Lead-lag relationship between soybean futures in U.S. and Brazil 
03/01/2005-07/31/2012 03/01/2005-06/30/2015 
0 1H : =0α  0 2H : =0α  0 1H : =0α  0 2H : =0α  
1.03 4.02** 0.01 8.64*** 
US Brazil⇒  US Brazil⇒  
Panel B: Lead-lag relationship between U.S. and Chinese No. 2 soybean futures 
03/01/2005-08/31/2009 03/01/2005-06/30/2015 
0 1H : =0α  0 2H : =0α  0 1H : =0α  0 2H : =0α  
12.27*** 4.13** 9.79*** 8.53*** 
2US ChinaNo⇔  2US ChinaNo⇔  
*,**,*** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
        Table 1.3 presents the parameter estimates that characterize the long-run equilibrium 
relationship and the speed of adjustments to the long-run equilibrium. 1tECT −  is the error 
correction term of the VECM model, and its coefficient represents the adjustment speed to 
long-run equilibrium. tUS∆  is the close-to-close return of soybean futures in the U.S. tBR∆  is 
the close-to-close return of soybean futures in Brazilian market. 2tCH∆  is the close-to-close 
return of Chinese No. 2 soybean futures. 
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Table 1.3: Estimated results of linear error correction model (ECM) 
 Panel A: U.S. and Brazilian soybean futures contracts 
 
03/01/2005-07/31/2012 03/01/2005-06/30/2015 
tUS∆  tBR∆  tUS∆  tBR∆  
1tECT −  -0.0089 0.0138* -0.0005 0.0149** 
1tUS −∆  0.0565 0.192*** 0.0485 0.1615*** 
1tBR −∆  -0.0685 -0.0774* -0.0731 -0.0577* 
Constant -0.0002 0.0019* 0.0001 0.0033** 
 1.008t t tECT US BR= − ∗  1.023t t tECT US BR= − ∗  
 Panel B: U.S. and Chinese No. 2 soybean futures contracts 
 03/01/2005-08/31/2009 03/01/2005-06/30/2015 
 tUS∆  2tCH∆  tUS∆  2tCH∆  
1tECT −  -0.0296*** 0.0122* -0.0128*** 0.0089** 
1tUS −∆  0.0139 0.1143*** 0.0102 0.1096*** 
12tCH −∆  0.0362 0.0199 0.0156 -0.0078 
Constant -0.0016* 0.0014* -0.0061** 0.0046** 
 0.955 2t t tECT US CH= − ∗  1.014 2t t tECT US CH= − ∗  
*,**,*** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
        The implication of estimation results in table 1.3 coincide with the test results in table 1.2. 
The significance of estimated coefficients for ECT implies that U.S. soybean futures prices 
lead the price in Brazil and that the prices of U.S. and Chinese No. 2 futures influence each 
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other. The significant positive sign of 1tUS −∆  in each estimated equation suggests an increasing 
price change in other markets when the soybean futures price increases in the U.S. market. 
Finally, the adjustment speed to deviations from the long-run equilibrium is characterized by 
the magnitude of significant coefficient of ECT, and the long-run equilibrium relationship 
between prices is characterized by a co-integrating vector in ECT expression. 
        Turning to the analysis of a non-linear long-run causality relationship, we test whether or 
not the soybean futures prices in different markets are threshold co-integrated. For the pairs of 
linear co-integrated prices, the presence of a threshold is tested and estimated via the 
application of a SupLM test by Hansen and Seo (2002). This tests the null hypothesis of linear 
(Johansen) co-integration against the alternative hypothesis of threshold co-integration. Table 
1.4 displays the test statistics and their bootstrapped p-values out of four data samples. Only 
the whole period pair of prices between U.S. and Chinese No. 2 soybean futures supports a 
threshold co-integration at a bootstrapped p-value of 0.035.  
Table 1.4: Test of linear co-integration against threshold co-integration 
 Test Statistic P-value 
US and Brazil (03/01/2005-07/31/2012) 13.66 0.384 
US and Brazil (03/01/2005-06/30/2015) 16.10 0.181 
US and CH No. 2  (03/01/2005-08/31/2009) 16.54 0.109 
US and CH No. 2  (03/01/2005-06/30/2015) 20.70 0.035 
 
        Compared to the linear estimation in table 1.3 above, the co-integrating coefficient for 
this threshold co-integrated price pair decreases from 1.023 to 0.97. This again shows a strong 
co-movement between Chinese No. 2 soybean futures price and the U.S. soybean futures price. 
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The estimated critical threshold value is 0.26 cents per bushel, which divides the whole data 
set into two regimes. There are 86.9% observations that fall into the usual regime 
| 0.97 2 | 0.26t tUS CH− ∗ ≤ , while the remaining 13.1% of observations belong to the unusual 
regime | 0.97 2 | 0.26t tUS CH− ∗ > . The estimated TVECM model is fully represented as  
tUS∆ =
* *
1 1 1 1
** * *
1 1 1 1
0.0016 0.0084 0.0366 0.0237 2 ,| | 0.26
0.0158 0.0394 0.0773 0.0512 2 ,| | 0.26
t t t t
t t t t
ECT US CH ECT
ECT US CH ECT
− − − −
− − − −
− − + ∆ + ∆ ≤

+ − ∆ − ∆ >
 
2tCH∆ =
*** ** ***
1 1 1 1
***
1 1 1 1
0.0016 0.0083 0.1108 0.0162 2 ,| | 0.26
0.0061 0.0153 0.0986 0.0658 2 ,| | 0.26
t t t t
t t t t
ECT US CH ECT
ECT US CH ECT
− − − −
− − − −
 + + ∆ − ∆ ≤

− − + ∆ + ∆ >
 
where 0.97 2t t tECT US CH= − ∗  
        The adjustment parameters of ECT in the U.S. equation are -0.0084 and 0.0394 in the 
usual and unusual regime, respectively. This difference in the statistically significant 
magnitude of ECT coefficient indicates a faster adjustment speed toward long-run equilibrium 
when the absolute value of price deviation from equilibrium exceeds the critical threshold. In 
both the usual and the unusual regimes, the estimated coefficients of 1tUS −∆  are significantly 
different from zero in the Chinese No. 2 equation, while the estimated coefficients of 12tCH −∆  
are not statistically significant in the U.S. equation. This suggests that there is a significant 
short-run response of the Chinese No. 2 soybean futures price to the price change in the U.S. 
When the U.S. soybean futures price changes by 1%, the Chinese No. 2 soybean futures price 
changes by 0.1108% and 0.0986% in the same direction when deviation from equilibrium 
belongs to the usual and unusual regime, respectively. These short-run adjustment parameters 
provide evidence that prices in the U.S. typically lead prices for the Chinese No. 2 soybean 
futures contract. 
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        Turning to the remaining five pairs of futures prices, which do not exhibit linear co-
integration relations, we apply a SupWard test by Seo (2006) to test whether or not they are 
threshold co-integrated and to demonstrate parameter estimates. Specifically, we implement 
threshold co-integration analysis for the post-break period prices of U.S. and Brazilian soybean 
futures, the post-break period prices of U.S. and Chinese No. 2 soybean futures and each sub-
period of U.S. and Chinese No. 1 soybean futures. 
        Table 1.5 shows the results of the test of no co-integration versus threshold co-integration. 
Two pairs of prices reject the no co-integration null hypothesis at a less-than 10% significant 
level. This provides evidence of threshold co-integration between these prices. The 
bootstrapped p-value is 0.001 and 0.076 for the pre-break period and the whole period of prices 
between U.S. and Chinese No. 1 contracts, respectively. The test results for the other three 
pairs of soybean futures prices are not significant at conventional levels. 
Table 1.5: Test of no co-integration against threshold co-integration 
 Test Statistic P-value 
US and Brazil (08/01/2012-05/30/2015) 15.20 0.103 
US and CH No. 1  (03/01/2005-10/31/2008) 16.36 0.001 
US and CH No. 1  (11/01/2008-06/30/2015) 19.39 0.551 
US and CH No. 1  (03/01/2005-06/30/2015) 13.15 0.076 
US and CH No. 2  (09/01/2009-06/30/2015) 10.67 0.316 
 
        The co-integrating coefficient is estimated as 0.94β =  for the pre-break period data of 
U.S. and Chinese No. 1 soybean futures, showing a strong responsiveness of the Chinese No. 
1 contract price to the U.S. soybean futures price. The estimated threshold point is 0.09 cent 
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per bushel, which divides the observations into two regimes. Of the observations, 84.3% fall 
into the usual regime | 0.94 1 | 0.09t tUS CH− ∗ ≤ , and the remaining 15.7% of observations 
belong to the unusual regime | 0.94 1 | 0.09t tUS CH− ∗ > . The estimated TVECM model is fully 
represented as 
tUS∆ =
*
1 1 1 1
**
1 1 1 1
0.0011 0.0134 0.0135 0.0590 1 ,| | 0.09
0.0035 0.0511 0.1678 0.3792 1 ,| | 0.09
t t t t
t t t t
ECT US CH ECT
ECT US CH ECT
− − − −
− − − −
 − − ∆ ∆ ≤

− + ∆ − ∆ >
 
1tCH∆ =
***
1 1 1 1
** ** *** ***
1 1 1 1
0.0002 0.0008 0.2650 0.0850 1 ,| | 0.09
0.0031 0.0407 0.3589 0.3176 1 ,| | 0.09
t t t t
t t t t
ECT US CH ECT
ECT US CH ECT
− − − −
− − − −
 − + ∆ + ∆ ≤

− + + ∆ − ∆ >
 
where 0.94 1t t tECT US CH= − ∗  
        The long-run adjustment parameters of ECT in Chinese No. 1 equations are significantly 
different from zero in the unusual regime, while the long-run adjustment parameters of ECT 
in U.S. equations are not statistically significant. This indicates that the U.S. soybean futures 
price drives the Chinese No.1 soybean futures price toward the equilibrium level. In particular, 
the adjustment parameters of ECT in the Chinese No. 1 equation are 0.0008 and 0.0407 in the 
usual and unusual regime, respectively. This difference in the magnitude of ECT coefficient 
demonstrates a faster adjustment speed toward long-run equilibrium when the absolute value 
of deviation from equilibrium exceeds the critical threshold. In both the usual and the unusual 
regimes, the estimated coefficients of 1tUS −∆  are significantly different from zero in the 
Chinese No. 1 equation. This suggests that there is a significant short-run response of the 
Chinese No. 1 soybean futures price to the price change in U.S. When the U.S. soybean futures 
price changes by 1%, the Chinese No. 1 soybean futures price changes by 0.2650% and 
0.3589% in the same direction when deviation from equilibrium belongs to the usual and 
unusual regime, respectively. These short-run adjustment parameters provide evidence that 
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prices in the U.S. typically lead prices for the Chinese No. 1 soybean futures contract, this 
result coincides with the results from the long-run adjustment parameters of the ECT. 
        For the whole period data of U.S. and Chinese No.1 soybean futures price, the co-
integrating coefficient is estimated as 0.98β = , showing a strong responsiveness of the 
Chinese No. 1 contract price to the U.S. soybean futures price. The estimated threshold point 
is 0.41 cents per bushel, which divides the observations into two regimes. Of the observations, 
92.5% fall into the usual regime | 0.98 1 | 0.41t tUS CH− ∗ ≤ , and the remaining 7.5% 
observations belong to the unusual regime | 0.98 1 | 0.41t tUS CH− ∗ > . The estimated TVECM 
model is fully represented as 
tUS∆ = 1 1 1 1*** **
1 1 1 1
0.0011 0.0065 0.0296 0.0443 1 ,| | 0.41
0.0073 0.0147 0.2369 0.2729 1 ,| | 0.41
t t t t
t t t t
ECT US CH ECT
ECT US CH ECT
− − − −
− − − −
− − + ∆ − ∆ ≤
 + − ∆ − ∆ >
 
1tCH∆ =
*** ** ***
1 1 1 1
** **
1 1 1 1
0.0012 0.0049 0.2189 0.0112 1 ,| | 0.41
0.0181 0.0387 0.0651 0.1274 1 ,| | 0.41
t t t t
t t t t
ECT US CH ECT
ECT US CH ECT
− − − −
− − − −
 + + ∆ − ∆ ≤

+ − ∆ + ∆ >
 
where 0.98 1t t tECT US CH= − ∗   
        The long-run adjustment parameters of the ECT in the Chinese No. 1 equations are 
significantly different from zero in both the usual and unusual regimes, while the long-run 
adjustment parameters of ECT in the U.S. equations are not statistically significant. This 
indicates that the U.S. soybean futures price drives the Chinese No. 1 soybean futures price 
toward the equilibrium level. In particular, the adjustment parameters of the ECT in the 
Chinese No. 1 equation are 0.0049 and 0.0387 in the usual and unusual regimes, respectively. 
This difference in the magnitude of the ECT coefficients suggests a faster adjustment speed 
when the absolute value of the deviation from equilibrium exceeds the critical threshold. In the 
usual region, the estimated coefficient of 1tUS −∆  is significantly different from zero in the 
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Chinese No. 1 equation while the estimated coefficient of 11tCH −∆  is not statistically 
significant in the U.S. equation. This suggests that there is a significant short-run response of 
the Chinese No. 1 soybean futures price to price changes in the U.S. When the U.S. soybean 
futures price changes by 1%, the Chinese No. 1 soybean futures price changes by 0.2189% in 
the same direction. These short-run adjustment parameters provide evidence that prices in the 
U.S. typically lead prices for the Chinese No. 1 soybean futures contract, coinciding with the 
results from the long-run adjustment parameters of the ECT. 
        In summary, the co-integration results demonstrate unidirectional long-run price causality 
from U.S. to Brazilian and U.S. to Chinese No. 1 soybean futures markets, and a bi-directional 
long-run causality relationship between U.S. and Chinese No. 2 soybean futures markets. 
However, the estimation results that indicate Chinese soybean futures prices leading the price 
of soybean futures in U.S. are only significant in the unusual sample regime, indicating that 
soybean futures prices in Brazil or China are still led by futures prices in the U.S.  
1.4.2 Short-Run Causal Effect 
        We are interested in two different short-run causal effects. One is the contemporaneous 
effect of U.S. Globex overnight return on the daytime returns of soybean futures in China’s 
market. The other is the seasonal harvest effect on U.S. and Brazilian soybean futures returns. 
        Since U.S. soybean futures contracts can be traded through the Globex overnight 
platform, the Chinese soybean futures daytime return may be affected by this synchronous 
trading. Our analysis of the short-run causal effect concentrates on how daytime returns in 
China are affected by the information content of U.S. overnight prices. For simplicity, we set
1p q= =   and derive the unstructured estimation of the ARDL(1,1) model by ordinary least 
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squares.3 In particular, the impact of U.S. overnight returns on Chinese daytime returns is 
examined by the following regressions: 
 1 1 1 1 1 1* * *
D N N D
t t t t tCH US US CHα β η γ ε− −∆ = + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +  
 2 2 2 1 2 1* * *
N D D N
t t t t tUS CH CH USα β η γ ε− −∆ = + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +   
        Table 1.6 reports the estimation results for different sub-period samples. It shows that 
U.S. soybean futures overnight returns and Chinese No. 1 soybean futures daytime returns 
significantly affect each other in five out of eleven years, while estimation results of U.S. 
soybean futures overnight returns and Chinese No. 2 soybean futures daytime returns are not 
statistically significant at conventional levels. These results indicate that information about 
U.S. Globex overnight trading influences the price change of Chinese No. 1 soybean futures 
contracts rather than No. 2 soybean futures contracts. This is mainly because Chinese No. 1 
contracts are more active in the market. Thus, the short-run market price of No. 1 contracts 
would be more sensitive to the price in other markets due to no arbitrage theory. Therefore, the 
soybean futures price in Chinese No. 1 contracts are not only threshold co-integrated with those 
in the U.S. in the long-run, its short-run price change is also influenced by the information 
from overnight price changes in the U.S. market as well. Except for 2015, all significant 
coefficients of iβ s are positive, indicating that the price increase in U.S. overnight trading will 
stimulate the trading of Chinese No. 1 soybean futures contracts and tend to increase daytime 
return.  
                                                 
3 Imposing no structure on the relationship of the coefficients of the lagged explanators may cause 
multicollinearity, leading to high variance of the coefficient estimates. 
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Table 1.6: U.S. overnight and Chinese daytime return 
  
Column A: U.S. and Chinese 
No. 1 Contract 
Column B: U.S. and Chinese 
No. 2 Contract 
Year 
Dependent 
Variable 
iβ   iβ  
2005 
DCH   0.2117*** 0.1109 
NUS  0.5859*** 0.1151 
2006 
DCH  0.1390* -0.0658 
NUS  0.1951* -0.0359 
2007 
DCH  0.0499 0.0208 
NUS  0.1125 0.0152 
2008 
DCH  0.0759* 0.0530 
NUS  0.1933* 0.0939 
2009 
DCH  0.0669 0.0694 
NUS  0.1656 0.0689 
2010 
DCH  -0.0002 -0.0256 
NUS  -0.0001 -0.0339 
2011 
DCH  0.0899* -0.0071 
NUS  0.1514* -0.0076 
2012 
DCH  0.0717 -0.0225 
NUS  0.1516 -0.0835 
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Table 1.6 continued 
2013 
DCH  -0.0424 0.1245 
NUS  -0.0514 0.0907 
2014 
DCH  0.0084 -0.0356 
NUS  0.0063 -0.0572 
2015 
DCH  -0.3805* 0.0916 
NUS  -0.1151* 0.0910 
*,**,*** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
        The other temporal causal effect we are interested in is the seasonal harvest effect on U.S. 
and Brazilian soybean futures. From the long-run analysis above, we conclude that soybean 
futures prices in the U.S. market lead those prices in the Brazilian market. In the short-run, 
however, this may not always be the case. The U.S. peak harvest period extends from May to 
October, while peak harvest period in Brazil extends from November to April. As a result, it 
is likely that the Brazilian soybean futures price leads the price in the U.S. in its harvest period 
when a strong seasonal effect exists. Table 1.7 illustrates the results of a causality test in each 
year, where expected seasonal causality exists in five out of ten years, suggesting a weak 
seasonal causal effect between U.S. and Brazilian soybean futures prices over time.  
Table 1.7: Causality test of U.S. and Brazilian seasonal production effect 
US vs. Brazil 
Nov-April Period 
Causality Test 
0 1H : =0α  0 2H : =0α  
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Table 1.7 continued 
Year 2005 7.34*** 0.07 
Analysis Brazil US⇒  
Year 2006 2.39 1.56 
Analysis - 
Year 2007 0.01 4.00** 
Analysis US Brazil⇒  
Year 2008 3.37* 8.58** 
Analysis Brazil US⇔  
Year 2009 1.81 0.77 
Analysis - 
Year 2010 3.51* 3.51* 
Analysis Brazil US⇔  
Year 2011 0.16 7.62** 
Analysis US Brazil⇒  
Year 2012 6.31** 0.29 
Analysis Brazil US⇒  
Year 2013 0.25 2.58 
Analysis - 
Year 2014 5.28** 0.23 
Analysis Brazil US⇒  
- indicates insignificant causality. *,**,*** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
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1.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
       This paper offers a comprehensive study on price causality between soybean futures prices 
in different markets from 2005 to 2015. Both long-run and short-run price relations are 
examined by various time-series methods. The long-run empirical results in section 4 indicate 
that the U.S. soybean futures market is the most influential market, and soybean futures prices 
in other markets like Brazil and China are led by the price change in the U.S. However, some 
sub-period co-integration tests show that there is no directional causality between U.S. and 
Chinese No. 2 soybean futures prices, and that there is a unidirectional causality between U.S. 
and Chinese No. 1 soybean futures prices. Intuitively, the rapid growth of both Chinese 
soybean spot and futures markets make them more influential to futures prices in the world. 
Thus, the lead-lag relationship between U.S. and Chinese soybean futures has been changed in 
recent years. If we form a liquid trading strategy based on whole period lead-lag relationship 
between U.S. and Chinese soybean futures prices,4 we find in appendix A4 that the return for 
trading strategy beats the real return in only four out of eleven years, showing that the 
directional causality between U.S. and Chinese soybean futures markets is not always robust. 
        This paper also investigates two types of temporal price causalities. One is the effect of 
overnight price changes of U.S. soybean futures through the Globex electronic trading system 
on the daytime return of Chinese soybean futures, the other is the seasonal harvest effect 
between U.S. and Brazilian soybean futures prices. The results indicate that the Globex 
                                                 
4 The strategy is to purchase and sale of the Chinese soybean futures contract at time t when the 
U.S. soybean futures return was positive at time t-1. Otherwise, keep the asset and earn risk-free 
interest return. 
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overnight price change in soybean futures affects, to some extent, the daytime price of Chinese 
No. 1 soybean futures, but there is no significant evidence indicating that overnight trading 
affects Chinese No. 2 soybean futures. Moreover, half of empirical tests about seasonal harvest 
effect match with our intuitive expectation, indicating a week seasonal causality between U.S. 
and Brazilian soybean futures prices according to their harvest periods. 
        In general, we can conclude from this paper that the U.S. still plays an important role in 
the worldwide soybean market, and the price changes in U.S. soybean futures will affect the 
futures price in other markets like China and Brazil. However, with the development of 
soybean markets in Brazil and China, this long-run unidirectional price causality from the U.S. 
to Brazil or from the U.S. to China has been weakened, and the opposite direction of price 
causality has begun to emerge. 
1.6 Appendix 
Table 1.8: Unit root tests for U.S. and Brazil contracts in each sub-period 
 
03/01/2005-07/31/2012 08/01/2012-06/30/2015 03/01/2005-06/30/2015 
ADF Test PP Test ADF Test PP Test ADF Test PP Test 
US  1.2643 -0.8794 0.4349 -1.5024 0.537 -1.8268 
US∆  -29.5422*** -40.8397*** -23.1862*** -30.7071*** -34.4713*** -48.3848*** 
BR  1.5526 -0.7508 0.2979 -1.4684 0.6031 -1.87 
BR∆  -27.8188*** -37.3443*** -21.275*** -29.5627*** -32.3528*** -44.5508*** 
*,**,*** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.9: Unit root tests for U.S. and Chinese No. 1 contracts in each sub-period 
 
03/01/2005-10/31/2008 11/01/2008-06/30/2015 03/01/2005-06/30/2015 
ADF Test PP Test ADF Test PP Test ADF Test PP Test 
US  0.6333 -0.961 0.1158 -1.8888 0.537 -1.8268 
US∆  -21.1003*** -29.2323*** -26.9963*** -38.4172*** -34.4713*** -48.3848*** 
1CH  1.2178 -0.5078 0.41 -1.3797 1.1877 -1.5633 
1CH∆  -17.3573*** -25.8864*** -28.2249*** -37.3029*** -31.5805*** -44.6086*** 
NUS∆  -18.7024*** -27.9519*** -25.0827*** -38.2538*** -31.2631*** -47.4886*** 
1DCH∆  -13.518*** -25.9058*** -16.6432*** -27.8649*** -21.0603*** -37.7819*** 
*,**,*** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 1.10: Unit root tests for US and Chinese No. 2 contracts in each sub-period 
 
03/01/2005-08/31/2009 09/01/2009-06/30/2015 03/01/2005-06/30/2015 
ADF Test PP Test ADF Test PP Test ADF Test PP Test 
US  0.8018 -1.0523 -0.0632 -1.4082 0.537 -1.8268 
US∆  -23.1492*** -32.1139*** -25.2243*** -36.1708*** -34.4713*** -48.3848*** 
2CH  1.1567 -0.8125 -0.3902 -1.0234 0.6177 -1.7365 
2CH∆  -31.3313*** -31.0776*** -26.1722*** -37.7651*** -33.3303*** -48.3886*** 
NUS∆  -20.7158*** -31.3953*** -23.3838*** -35.3627*** -31.2631*** -47.4886*** 
2DCH∆  -13.8916*** -23.822*** -12.8969*** -20.0804*** -18.9965*** -32.6365*** 
*,**,*** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.11: Forecasted trading strategy vs. real return 
Year 
% of correct forecast 
direction 
Strategy return Real return 
2005 48.74% 94.47% 104.73% 
2006 46.90% 90.58% 117.01% 
2007 56.28% 158.22% 168.04% 
2008 52.79% 102.14% 83.23% 
2009 50.22% 132.64% 116.55% 
2010 50.44% 164.62% 109.95% 
2011 50.00% 95.80% 109.63% 
2012 48.00% 94.25% 105.61% 
2013 53.78% 66.91% 96.07% 
2014 42.61% 48.35% 76.74% 
2015 62.50% 135.55% 92.09% 
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CHAPTER 2. THE SUPPLY CURVE FOR CELLULOSIC 
ETHANOL 
Abstract 
        This paper examines the impact of feedstock supply mechanisms under conditions of 
spatial monopoly on the supply of cellulose to the plants and by implication on the supply of 
cellulosic ethanol. we show the minimization problem for cellulosic processors under three 
different collection mechanisms and provide optimal pricing rule and the optimal collection 
radius needed to meet feedstock supply requirements. These show that in the absence of 
competition the processor is indifferent between processor collection and supplier delivery, 
but that societal welfare is higher under supplier delivery. We then use a repeated Nash 
Equilibrium game to show that processor collection is first best for both incumbent and 
processor and is an effective deterrent against an entrant locating a plant within the draw area 
of the incumbent. We support the theoretical results with a numerical simulation showing the 
optimal premium and draw area under each mechanism. Third, we use the result of the 
simulation show the rate at which stover collection costs increase for a monopsonistic stover 
processor constrained to the original draw area. The slope of the marginal cost curve for this 
monopsonistic processor is then compared with the slope of the cost curve across other 
feedstocks. These results suggest that substantial quantities of these other feedstocks may be 
required to meet the mandate. 
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2.1 Introduction 
        Management at the first two commercial cellulosic ethanol producers have been willing 
to accept low feedstock supplier participation and a large draw area as an alternative to 
increasing the premium they pay for stover. This behavior is optimal if the plants are treated 
as monopsonistic buyers. The existing plants have also arranged to collect stover from some 
or all suppliers. This processor collection model is shown to be an effective way to deter future 
entrants from building plants within the draw area of the initial plants. As the cellulosic 
mandate causes more plants to come on line, these new plants will be close to, but will not 
overlap with, existing plants. All plants will be able to increase production within their original 
draw areas by increasing the premium offered for stover. However, the slope of the marginal 
cost function is steep due to monopsonistic competition. This situation was not anticipated by 
the original literature on the availability of cellulosic feedstock, where 100% participation was 
implicitly assumed. This low participation rate among stover producers puts in doubt the ability 
of the industry to meet the cellulosic mandate from agricultural residues alone and increases 
the likelihood that other more expensive feedstocks, such as perennial grasses will be required. 
        The cellulosic mandate written into the US renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) requires the 
use of almost 16 billion gallons of transportation fuel produced from grasses, trees, and 
agricultural and municipal waste (Bracmort 2015). If the law is implemented as originally 
proposed, mandated parties (blenders) will be required to purchase and use a specific quantity 
of cellulosic biofuels or to purchase Cellulosic Renewable Identification Numbers (CRINs) 
from another blender that has blended more cellulosic fuel than required. The market value of 
CRINs will rise to ensure that the combined value of the fuel and CRINs to cellulosic fuel 
processors is sufficient to cover the full production costs of the marginal fuel producer. This 
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law effectively creates a vertical demand curve for cellulosic ethanol at the quantity that is 
mandated for use each year. This means that the price and welfare implications of this policy 
will be determined at the intersection of the marginal cost curve and this mandated demand 
curve. As the annual mandate increases, the CRIN value will rise to ensure that the costs of the 
marginal supplier are fully met.  
        The existing literature on the availably of cellulosic feedstock, US DoE (2011), Ogden 
and Anderson (2011), Graham et al. (2007) and Archer and Johnson (2012), focused on 
whether sufficient cellulosic feedstocks would be physically available to meet the mandate. In 
a market based system, physical availability is not equal to quantity supplied. Individual 
owners of the feedstock must receive a price that is greater than their reservation price. 
Operators of cellulosic fuel plants may not be willing to pay a feedstock price that results in 
100% participation.  
        Earlier work by Ogden and Anderson (2011) and Dumortier (2015) found that the supply 
of corn stover and other agricultural wastes would be sufficient to meet the mandate. However, 
these authors assumed either 100% participation or homogenous processors. The supply curve 
for cellulosic ethanol will be different than that for corn ethanol in two important ways. First, 
feedstock suppliers are not homogenous with respect to the price at which they will supply. 
Second, the cellulosic ethanol producer will, at least initially, have monopsony power in the 
draw area near their plant.  
        This study draws on the experience of two of the first large scale cellulosic ethanol 
processors, both of which are located in Iowa and use corn stover as a feedstock. One of these 
plants collects all of the stover and pays each farmer in the draw area the same price. The other 
uses a mixed collection model where it accepts some farmer delivered stover and collects the 
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rest at a distance from the plant. The experience with these plants indicates that, under the 
current price structure, less than 20% of farmers are willing to participate (Pieper 2015). Corn 
farmers with the lowest reservation price typically grow continuous corn and use animal 
manure as fertilizer. Farmers in a corn-soybean rotation who use chemical fertilizer on erodible 
soils are much less likely to participate. The first group of feedstock suppliers view stover as a 
waste product that can actually reduce yields if it is not removed. Suppliers with high 
reservation prices value the carbon and fertilizer value of the stover that is removed. As a result 
of this heterogeneity, and the low participation rate, both plants have collection areas that are 
larger than originally anticipated and which can reach as far as 50 miles from the plant (Pieper 
2015; see also Swoboda 2014).  
        Cellulosic biofuel processors could increase the feedstock price in order to increase 
participation, but they are aware that they would be required to pay this additional price for 
those suppliers who are willing to deliver at the lower price. Instead, the processors have been 
willing to incur the additional transportation cost associated with very large draw areas. In 
essence, these processors are acting as monopsonistic buyers even though there is no barrier to 
entry other than the $200–$300 million construction cost.  
        The collection mechanism at both plants is unusual in that it depends on the use of plant-
owned transportation equipment and labor to collect stover from corn fields. This processor 
collection mechanism runs counter to that used for grain where grain suppliers deliver to a 
central location.  
        The objective of this article is to examine the impact of feedstock supply mechanisms 
under conditions of spatial monopoly on the supply of cellulose to the plants and by implication 
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on the supply of cellulosic ethanol. The theoretical underpinnings of the model are based on 
French (1960) and Melvin L. Greenhut et. al. (1987).  
        This cost structure is provided for: (a) a processor who can perfectly price discriminate; 
(b) a collection mechanism where all feedstock suppliers receive the same price and the 
processor pays all collection costs (processor collection); and, (c) a feedstock supplier delivery 
mechanism with a single price at the plant (supplier delivery). The assumption of perfect price 
discrimination is unrealistic and is provided only as a benchmark against which the other two 
systems can be evaluated. It is shown that the processor is indifferent between processor 
collection and supplier delivery, total costs are lower under supplier delivery, and that welfare 
is higher under supplier delivery. It is then shown that processor collection is an effective tool 
to prevent new plants from locating within a collection area that overlaps with that of the 
original plant.  
        If existing processors have an effective tool to prevent poaching from within their draw 
areas, then the mandate can only be met with stover if existing processors offer higher 
premiums to increase participation to expand capacity within existing draw areas. The slope of 
the marginal cost curve in this situation is much steeper than the cross feedstock supply curve 
presented in Ogden and Anderson. In other words, the mandate will be met only if other, more 
expensive feedstocks are used.  
        The article proceeds as follows: first, we show the minimization problem for processors 
under each of the three different collection mechanisms and provide optimal pricing rule and 
the optimal collection radius needed to meet feedstock supply requirements. Second, we 
develop and prove three propositions related to the delivery system. These show that in the 
absence of competition the processor is indifferent between processor collection and supplier 
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delivery, but that societal welfare is higher under supplier delivery. We use a repeated Nash 
Equilibrium game to show that processor collection is first best for both incumbent and 
processor. We then show that processor collection is an effective deterrent against an entrant 
locating a plant within the draw area of the incumbent. We support the theoretical results with 
a numerical simulation showing the optimal premium and draw area under each mechanism. 
Third, we use the result of the simulation show the rate at which stover collection costs increase 
for a monopsonistic stover processor constrained to the original draw area. A key parameter is 
the degree to which stover suppliers will respond to higher prices. This parameter can be 
uncovered if we assume it is known to the processors and that they are optimizing based on 
this value. The slope of the marginal cost curve for this monopsonistic processor is then 
compared with the slope of the cost curve across other feedstock. These results suggest that 
substantial quantities of these other feedstock may be required to meet the mandate. 
2.2  The Model 
2.2.1 Single Processor Model 
        Our model assumes that corn stover suppliers are heterogeneous and have different 
reservation values for their feedstock. Only when price received by suppliers exceed their 
reservation value are they willing to sell. As a result, the participation rate varies depending on 
the net price received for the feedstock. As long as the plant offers a positive price, some 
farmers will supply.  
        Suppose each unit of land produces one unit of corn stover. Land is uniformly located 
along a line with one land unit per unit distance. The processor is located at one end of the line. 
The fraction of each land unit that supplies stover is given by the participation rate function 
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( )s p bp= , where p is the net price received by the farmer and parameter b  characterizes 
supplier’s willingness to supply5. 
Collection Mechanism I, Perfect Price Discrimination 
        The first collection mechanism allows for perfect price discrimination and processor 
collection. From the processor perspective, this is an ideal case where the processor can elicit 
each supplier’s reservation value. We include this scenario because the outcomes mimic the 
radius the processor would choose if it did not behave in a monopsonistic fashion (Varian 
2009). In this scenario there is no deadweight loss and the system reaches a competitive 
equilibrium (Varian 2009).  
        Let R be the distance between the processor and the marginal farmer and p  is the highest 
reservation value in the collection region. Since each land unit supplies bp , the total supply 
received by the processor is bpR . The total requirement to reach capacity is Q  and so, 
Q bpR= . This implies that /R Q bp=  .  
        Here, the processor will pay each supplier their unique reservation value and the amount 
paid to each land unit is 2 2
0
0.5
p
bp bxdx bp− =∫ . If processor lacks the ability to discriminate 
farmers, it has to pay each land unit 2bp . Thus, 2
0
0.5
p
bxdx bp=∫  is the collection cost advantage 
                                                 
5 An alternative model that allows for a circular draw area and which allows for an optimal 
response when 100% participation is reached is available from the authors. Key results are 
identical.  
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by the processor’s price discrimination ability. In addition to the transportation cost, the total 
expenditure for processor to collect Q  amount of corn stove is given as  
Expenditure = 2 2 2
0
(0.5 ) 0.5 0.5
R
bp bptr dr bp R bptR+ = +∫  
Substitute in /R Q bp= to obtain  
Expenditure = 
2
0.5 0.5 tQpQ
bp
+  
        Minimizing total expenditure respect to price provides optimal price and collection 
distance 
0.5
* tQp
b
 =  
 
 and 
0.5
* QR
bt
 =  
 
. The larger the capacity, the higher the required price 
and the longer the collection distance. Substituting the equilibrium price and distance to 
processor’s expenditure function, the total expenditure for the processor is ( )0.5 1.5/t b Q  . It is 
useful to separate equilibrium payments and equilibrium transportation costs for the 
processor, where  
Payment =
*
2 2 0.5 1.5
0
0.5 0.5 0.5( / )
R
bp dr bp R t b Q= =∫  , 
Transportation cost =
*
2 0.5 1.5
0
0.5 0.5( / )
R
bptrdr bptR t b Q= =∫  
        As can be seen, half of money paid by processor is received by suppliers, and the other 
half is spent on transportation. 
Collection Mechanism II, Processor Collection 
        In this model the processor is responsible for the cost of stover transportation and pays 
every supplier the same price. Given price p  , the supply is Q bpR= . Thus, the required 
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distance to collect Q  is QR
bP
=  . If the distance between the supplier and processor is r R≤ , 
the total amount paid by the processor for each unit corn stover is p tr+ . Thus, total 
expenditure is given by 
Expenditure = 2 2
0
( ) 0.5 ( )
R
bp p tr dr bp R bpt R+ = +∫  
Substitute in /R Q bp=  to obtain  
Expenditure = 
2
0.5 tQpQ
bp
+  
Minimizing total expenditure with respect to price results in the optimal price and collection 
distance 
0.5
*
2
tQp
b
 =  
 
 and 
0.5
* 2QR
bt
 =  
 
. The collection distance in this scenario is larger than 
under perfect price scenario because processor does not have the ability to discriminate. 
Substituting the equilibrium price and distance into the expenditure function, total expenditure 
is ( )0.5 1.52 /t b Q .  
Separating the equilibrium payments and equilibrium transportation costs, the payment to 
suppliers is  
Payment =
*
2 2 0.5 1.5
0
2 ( / )
2
R
bp dr bp R t b Q= =∫  , 
and transportation cost is  
Transportation cost =
*
2 0.5 1.5
0
20.5 ( / )
2
R
bptrdr bptR t b Q= =∫  
Again, half of cost paid by the processor is received by farmers and the other half is spent on 
transportation. 
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Collection Mechanism III, Supplier Delivery 
        Under supplier delivery, the processor pays a price of p  at the plant when stover is 
delivered. In this case, the net price received by a supplier r  miles away is p tr− . Those who 
are closer to the processor will receive higher net prices and are more likely to participate. As 
a result, the participation rate is no longer constant within the collection area, that is 
( ) ( )s p b p tr= − . Assuming the marginal supplier is a distance R  from the processor, the total 
supply received by the processor is  
2
0
( ) 0.5
R
Q b p tr dr bpR btR= − = −∫   
Thus, the price offered by processor can be expressed in term of Q  as  
20.5 0.5Q btR Qp tR
bR bR
+
= = + . 
The total expenditure in this case is given by 
Expenditure = 2 2
0
( ) 0.5 0.5
R Qb p tr pdr bp R btpR tR Q
bR
 − = − = + 
 ∫
 
Minimizing total expenditure with respect to collection distance results in 
0.5
* 2QR
bt
 =  
 
, which 
is the same as that for processor collection. Substitute this expression into 0.5Qp tR
bR
= +  to 
obtain 
0.52* tQp
b
 =  
 
.  
The expression for expenditure of the processor is: 
Expenditure = ( )0.5 1.50.5 2 /QpQ tR Q t b Q
bR
 = + = 
 
, which is the same as the expression for 
processor collection case. Total transportation costs can be expressed as  
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Transportation cost = ( )0.52 2 3 1.5
0
1 1 2( ) /
2 3 3
R
b p tr trdr btpR bt R t b Q− = − =∫  
The model above indicates that the optimal collection distances are the same under processor 
collection and supplier delivery. 
Proposition 1. If transportation costs are identical for processor and supplier, the biofuel 
processor is indifferent between processor collection and supplier delivery and the optimal 
collection distance and resulting collection expenditure are the same for both mechanisms.  
Proof  
In processor collection mechanism, the expenditure minimization problem for processor to 
collect Q  amount of corn stover is expressed as 
2
{ }
min  0.5
p
tQpQ
bp
+  
The F.O.C is 
2
2 02
tQQ
bp
− = , which implies the solution 
0.5
*
2
tQp
b
 =  
 
 and 
0.5
* 2QR
bt
 =  
 
. 
Substituting the equilibrium price and distance to processor’s expenditure function, the total 
expenditure is given as ( )0.5 1.52 /t b Q .  
In the supplier delivery mechanism, the expenditure minimization problem for processor to 
collect Q  is expressed as 
{ }
min 0.5
R
Q tR Q
bR
 + 
 
 
The F.O.C is 
2
2
1 0
2
QtQ
bR
− = , which implies 
0.5
* 2QR
bt
 =  
 
. Thus, the optimal collection 
distance between processor collection mechanism and supplier delivery mechanism are both 
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given as 
0.52Q
bt
 
 
 
. Substitute this expression into 0.5Qp tR
bR
= +  to obtain optimal price 
0.52* tQp
b
 =  
 
. Total expenditures by the processor can be expressed as:
( )0.5 1.5* 2 /p Q t b Q=  which is the same as expenditure in the processor collection 
mechanism. Q.E.D. 
            The key reason makes processor is indifferent with processor collection and supplier 
delivery is because processor can’t price discriminate. This makes the processor can’t capture 
the supply efficiency, while the welfare for suppliers and society is higher in the supplier 
delivery mechanism.  
Proposition 2. Supplier welfare is higher and total transportation costs are lower under 
supplier delivery.  
Proof  
In either mechanism, the welfare, or, payment to the supplier is the difference between the total 
expenditure of the processor and the cost of transportation. In the processor collection 
mechanism, payment to suppliers is
*
2 2 0.5 1.5
0
2 ( / )
2
R
bp dr bp R t b Q= =∫ , which is half of the 
total expenditure. In supplier delivery mechanism, total expenditure 
( )0.5 1.50.5 2 /Q tR Q t b Q
bR
 + = 
 
 is needed to collection Q  amount of corn stover, while the 
transportation cost is ( )0.52 2 3 1.5
0
1 1 2( ) /
2 3 3
R
b W tr trdr btWR bt R t b Q− = − =∫ . Thus, the 
payment to suppliers is  
Payment = Expenditure – Transportation cost = ( )0.5 1.52 2 /
3
t b Q ,  
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which is two thirds of the total expenditure. As shown in Proposition 1 total expenditures are 
the same under both mechanisms. Participation under supplier delivery is highest near the 
plant. This reduces overall transportation costs The single price rule prohibits the plant from 
capturing the efficiencies associated with supplier delivery. Instead, these benefits are captured 
by suppliers located near the plant due to their locational advantage. Costs for processors are 
the same under both mechanisms and therefore societal welfare will be higher in the supplier 
delivery mechanism. Q.E.D. 
        Proposition 1 and 2 are similar to the spatial monopoly pricing results shown in Greenhut 
et. al. (1987) that a spatial monopolist's market boundaries and profit in the case of linear 
demand are identical for mill pricing and uniform delivered pricing, where mill pricing is 
similar to processor collection mechanism and uniform delivery pricing is similar to supplier 
delivery mechanism. Like the analysis in the standard spatial monopoly pricing model, the 
assumption of linear supply is critical in our model. The collection boundary for processor 
collection should be smaller than that of supplier delivery when supply function is more 
convex, and vice versa. These propositions help to explain why supplier delivery dominates in 
the grain system. This system leads to lower transportation costs and higher overall welfare. 
Why then has processor collection emerged for corn stover? 
2.2.2 Collection Mechanism as a Barrier to Entry 
        This section examines the impact of potential competition on the choice of collection 
strategy and on the total collection costs of the initial processor and potential entrant. Assume 
two homogenous processors, one an incumbent and the other a potential entrant. Both 
minimize total collection costs while meeting their capacity constraint. The degree of 
competition will be influenced by the distance between processors. If cellulosic fuel prices are 
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high and there are no untapped draw areas, then the second processor may choose a location 
that puts them within the draw area of an existing processor. If this were to occur, then it is 
likely the two plants would compete to attract suppliers and that the premium and participation 
rate would increase.  
In order to characterize the competition behavior between incumbent and entrant, we 
use a line model where incumbent and entrant be positioned at each end. The two processors 
are assumed to be identical in their production technology and capacity. They can choose either 
processor collection or supplier delivery. Thus, the optimization problem is the same for both. 
Each processor’s pricing and collection strategies, and therefore total collection cost will 
depend on the distance between them. When the distance between the two processors is greater 
than or equal to two times the optimal single collection distance, there is no competition and 
supplier delivery and processor collection results in the same collection distance and 
expenditure for both incumbent and entrant.  
            Let d  be the distance between two processors, competition exists when 
0.5
* 22 2 Qd R
bt
 < =  
 
. In this situation, the entrant chooses its optimal collection mechanism 
based on the incumbent’s strategy, then the incumbent reacts, and the entrant reacts again and 
so on. The four competitive outcomes in a Nash Equilibrium framework are: 
  Entrant 
  Processor  Collection Supplier Delivery 
Incumbent 
Processor Collection ( )( ), ( )PP PPI EC d C d   ( )( ), ( )PS SPI EC d C d  
Supplier Delivery ( )( ), ( )SP PSI EC d C d  ( )( ), ( )SS SSI EC d C d  
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where d  is the distance between processors, ( )jkiC d  denotes the total cost in equilibrium for 
processor i  using strategy j  when the other processor using strategy k . Here ,i I E=  
represents Incumbent and Entrant, respectively, and , , Sj k P= represents processor collection 
and supplier delivery, respectively. The optimal collection mechanism and total collection cost 
for plants in each case are derived by solving a repeated game Nash Equilibrium.  
        Specifically, we start with the incumbent’s pricing strategy (1) (1) (1)( , )I I IS p R= . Given this 
strategy, the entrant picks its best response while meeting its capacity needs at minimum cost, 
defined as (1) (1) (1) (1)( ) ( , )E I E ES S p R= . The incumbent then has to increase its collection distance or 
collection price to (2) (1) (2) (2)( ) ( , )I E I IS S p R=  because some suppliers located at the edge of the 
incumbents draw area will receive a higher net prices from entrant. The entrant has to respond 
to the incumbent’s response which is defined as (2) (2) (2) (2)( ) ( , )E I E ES S p R= . This procedure will 
continue until an equilibrium strategy (*) (*) (*) (*)( ) ( , )I E I IS S p R=  and 
(*) (*) (*) (*)( ) ( , )E I E ES S p R= is 
achieved.  
        There are three different strategy combinations: (a) both incumbent and entrant use 
processor collection; (b) both incumbent and entrant use supplier delivery; (c) incumbent and 
entrant use a different mechanism. 
 Case 1: Both incumbent and entrant use processor collection. 
        Let ( , )I Ip R  and ( , )E Ep R be the pricing strategy for incumbent and entrant, respectively. 
The resulting collection amounts are I I IQ bp R=  and E E EQ bp R= . Since both the incumbent 
and the entrant use processor collection, the one that offers the higher price will capture all 
suppliers in the overlapping collection area. If I Ep p>  , the incumbent will capture all 
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suppliers in the overlapping collection area and its optimal strategy should be the same as for 
the single processor case. That is * *( , ) ( , )I Ep R p R= . Since both processors require the same 
amount of corn stover, I Ep p>  implies that 
*
I ER R R= < . Thus, the distance between two 
processors is *2I Ed R R R= + > . This contradicts the assumption that 
*2d R<  (this 
assumption ensures the existence of competition). On the other hand, if  I Ep p< , the entrant 
will capture all suppliers in the overlapping collection area and its optimal strategy will be the 
same as for the single processor case. That is * *( , ) ( , )E Ep R p R= . Since both processors require 
the same amount of stover, I Ep p<  implies that 
*
I ER R R> = , and the distance 
*2I Ed R R R= + > . This again contradicts with the assumption that 
*2d R< . As a result, 
I Ep p p= =  in equilibrium. The collection distance in this scenario can be illustrated as 
follows: 
 
Therefore, the amount collected by incumbent is given as  
( ) 0.5 ( ) 0.5 0.5 ( )I E I E I EQ bp d R bp R R d bpd bp R R= − + + − = + −   
Similarly, the amount collected by entrant is given as  
( ) 0.5 ( ) 0.5 0.5 ( )E I I E E IQ bp d R bp R R d bpd bp R R= − + + − = + −  
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From I EQ Q Q= =  , it obtains to I ER R R= = . Thus, 0.5Q bpd=  implies that 
* 2Qp
bd
= . The 
total cost for each processor is then expressed as 
0
1( ) ( )
2
d R RPP
I d R
C bp p tr dr bp p tr dr
−
−
= + + +∫ ∫  
                    2 2 2 2
1 1( ) ( ) (2 ) (2 )
2 2 4
bptbp d R d R bp R d bpt R d= − + − + − + − . 
Substituting *
2Qp
bd
=  and minimize the total expenditure respect to R  implies that * 0.5R d= . 
Thus, each processor collects from those suppliers close to it and they both increase the 
collection price and participation to avoid a price war in the overlapping area. The equilibrium 
collection distance looks as follows 
 
And total collection cost is given by 
2/2
0
2( )
4
dPP
I
Q tdQC bp p tr dr
bd
= + = +∫  and 
2/2
0
2( )
4
dPP
E
Q tdQC bp p tr dr
bd
= + = +∫  
Case 2: Both incumbent and entrant use supplier delivery mechanism 
        Let ( , )I Ip R  and ( , )E Ep R be the pricing strategy for incumbent and entrant, respectively. 
If the corn stover producer locates Ir  distance to incumbent and Er  distance to entrant (
I Er r d+ = ) , he will receive I Ip tr−  net price if he supplies to incumbent and receive E Ep tr−  
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net price if he supplies to entrant. The supplier will always prefer supplying the processor from 
where he can receive higher net prices. As a result, the marginal supplier for both processors 
should be indifferent between supplying either incumbent or entrant. The collection distance 
for each processor can be represented in the following figure: 
 
Since IR  and ER  are the collection distance for incumbent and entrant, respectively, the 
marginal supplier located IR  miles away from incumbent and ER  miles away from entrant 
should receive the same net prices from two processors. That is, I I E Ep tR p tR− = − . Since 
I Ed R R= + , it obtains the collection distance for incumbent is 2 2
I E
I
p pdR
t
−
= +  and the 
collection distance for entrant is 
2 2
I E
E
p pdR
t
−
= − . Given the collection distance IR  and ER
, the amount collected by incumbent is 2
0
( ) 0.5I
R
I I I I IQ b p tr dr bp R btR= − = −∫ . Similarly, the 
amount collected by entrant is 20.5E E E EQ bp R btR= − . 
        Since I EQ Q Q= = , it implies that 
2 20.5 0.5I I I E E Ebp R btR bp R btR− = − . Substituting the 
expressions of IR  and ER  into this equation, we get 
2( ) 0
2
I Ep p
t
−
= , which implies 
I Ep p p= = . Thus, 2I E
dR R= = . The equilibrium collection distance looks as follows: 
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Substituting 
2I E
dR R= =  into the expression of Q  to obtain 
2
2 2 2
bpd bt dQ  = −  
 
. Thus, the 
price offered by processor is  
2
4
Q tdp
bd
= +   and the total cost is: 
2/2
0
2( )
4
dSS
I
Q tdQC b p tr pdr
bd
= − = +∫   
2/2
0
2( )
4
dSS
E
Q tdQC b p tr pdr
bd
= − = +∫  .  
        This is the same as the case where both processors use processor collection. In this case, 
both processors increase the offer price so as to collect more from those suppliers close to them 
and to avoid the price war in overlapping area. 
Case 3: one uses processor collection and the other uses supplier delivery 
        Without generality, we assume the incumbent use processor collection and entrant use 
supplier delivery mechanism. Let ( , )I Ip R  and ( , )E Ep R be the pricing strategy for incumbent 
and entrant, respectively. For incumbent using processor collection mechanism, I I IQ bp R=  , 
which implies II
I
Qp
bR
= . For the entrant who uses supplier delivery mechanism, the amount it 
collected is 2
0
( ) 0.5E
R
E E E E EQ b p tr dr bp R btR= − = −∫ , which implies that 
20.5E E
E
E
Q btRP
bR
+
= . 
52 
 
This is equivalent to 0.5 0.5 ( )
( )
E E
E E I
E I
Q Qp tR t d R
bR b d R
= + = + −
−
. Since the collection 
distances are IR  and ER , the supplier located IR  miles away from processor collection plant 
and ER  miles away from supplier delivery plant should be indifferent between these two 
processors as he receives the same net prices from them. That is, 
( )I E E E Ip p tR p t d R= − = − − . Since I EQ Q Q= = , substituting Ip  and Ep  into this equation 
obtains 1( ) ( )
( ) 2I E I II I
Q Qp p t d R t d R
b d R bR
= − − = − − =
−
. This relationship is equivalent to 
1 ( ) 0
( ) 2 II I
Q Q t d R
b d R bR
− = − >
−
, which is I Id R R− < . Thus, ( )2I I E
dR d R R> > − >  must 
holds. Therefore, the collection radius for the incumbent who uses processor collection is 
always larger than the collection radius for entrant who uses supplier delivery. 
 
        Solving the above equation, the optimal collection distance can be expressed as function 
*( , )IR d Q  and 
* ( , )ER d Q . And the prices offered to supplier in each mechanism can be 
expressed as *( , )Ip d Q  and 
* ( , )Ep d Q . The total cost for processor collection incumbent is 
2
*
*0.5
PS
I I
I
tQC p Q
bp
= + . And the total cost for supplier delivery entrant is *SPE EC p Q= . 
Proposition 3. The incumbent processor can use processor collection as a way to add costs to 
an entrant who is considering an overlapping collection area. In this case, both incumbent and 
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entrant will use processor collection to lower total expenditure when there is competition for 
suppliers. 
Proof  
We first show both incumbent and entrant will use processor collection mechanism under 
competition. Let pR  be the collection distance for processor using processor collection 
mechanism and sR  be the collection distance for processor using supplier delivery mechanism. 
As shown above, the total cost for processor using supplier delivery is a function of collection 
distance sR ,which can be expressed as
2
( )
2
s
s s
s
tR QQf R p Q
bR
= = + , where sp  is the price 
offered by processor using supplier delivery mechanism. The F.O.C of this equation is
2
2'( ) 02s s
Q tQf R
bR
= − + = , which implies 
0.5
*2
s
QR R
bt
 = ± = ± 
 
. When *0 sR R< <  , 
2
2'( ) 02s s
Q tQf R
bR
= − + < , indicating shorter collection distance results in higher collection 
expenditure.  
            When the incumbent uses processor collection mechanism, the total cost for the entrant 
is 
22
4
Q tdQ
bd
+  if it also uses processor collection. This expenditure is the same as ( )
2
df . If the 
entrant uses supplier delivery, its total expenditure is
*2
*
*( ) 2
s
s
s
tR QQf R
bR
= + . Notice that the 
collection radius for processor using processor collection is always larger than the collection 
radius for processor using supplier delivery which implies *
2s
dR < . Therefore, it must be true 
that
*2
*
*( ) ( )2 2
s
s
s
tR QQ df R f
bR
= + > =
22
4
Q tdQ
bd
+ . As a result, the entrant will always use 
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processor collection to lower it collection expenditure when the incumbent uses processor 
collection.  
        When the incumbent uses supplier delivery, the entrant’s total collection expenditure is 
22
4
Q tdQ
bd
+  if it also use supplier delivery. If the entrant use processor collection, the 
expenditure is 
*2 2
*
* *0.5 ( )2
p
p
p
tR QtQ Qp Q g R
bp bR
+ = + = . Similar to function *( )sf R , function 
( )pg R is decreasing in 
*(0, )R . Since the collection radius for processor using collection 
processor is always larger than the collection radius for the processor using supplier delivery, 
* *
2p
dR R≥ >  holds. Thus, 
*2 2
*
*
2( ) ( )
2 4 2
p
p
p
tR QQ Q tdQ dg R g
bR bd
= + < + = . Thus, the entrant will 
always choose processor collection to lower its total collection expenditure when the 
incumbent uses supplier delivery.  
        In general, the best strategy for entrant is to use processor collection, no matter what 
strategy the incumbent uses. Given entrant’s best response, the incumbent will always use 
processor collection. That is because the total cost under processor collection, 
22
4
Q tdQ
bd
+ , is 
lower than the cost supplier delivery mechanism, 
*2
* 2
s
s
tR QQ
bR
+ , when *
2s
dR <  holds. On the 
other hand, incumbent processor can use processor collection as a way to add costs to an entrant 
who is considering an overlapping collection area. By using the processor collection 
mechanism, the incumbent processor can increase the cost of entrant from a lower level to 
22
4
Q tdQ
bd
+ .Q.E.D. 
55 
 
        Proposition 3 may explain why has processor collection has emerged for corn stover. It 
also shows that the incumbent can increase the entrant’s collection cost using processor 
collection. This increase in collection cost can be treated as the penalty for moving into the 
draw area of the incumbent. This penalty increases as the two plants get closer. The extra cost 
to the entrant occurs because both plants receive only one half of the stover sold in the area 
where they compete. As a result, both plants must increase premium in areas to attract 
suppliers.  
2.3 From Theoretical Analysis to Practical Simulation 
       Realistically, the collection region for a processor will better resemble a circle than a line. 
However, the line model can be generalized to a circle model by thinking of the line as a radius 
connecting the center of the circle to a point on the circumference. Integrating the line from 0 
to 2π , the quantity collected in the circle model can be obtained. Since the expenditure and 
collection distance are the same for processor collection and supplier delivery mechanism in 
the line model, it generalizes that the optimal collection radius (collection region) and 
collection expenditure are the same for processor collection and supplier delivery mechanism 
in the circle model as well. 
A Numerical Example  
        Table 2.1 compares the optimal collection costs per ton across three collection 
mechanisms in a circle model and under different assumptions about the feedstock supplier’s 
response to price change. These results are based on a transportation cost of $0.65 per ton per 
mile, a plant requirement for 300,000 MT/year of feedstock, and a 2 MT/acre corn stover 
removal rate—all of these values are based on Darr et al. (2013) which in turn are based on the 
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Du Pont plant located in central Iowa where corn is planted on one third of the total area 
(USDA NASS 2015).  
Table 2.1: Comparison between different collection mechanisms 
Comparison Between Different Collection Mechanism 
Response 
to price 
change 
Perfect Price 
Discrimination 
Processor Collection Supplier Delivery 
Radius 
% of 
supply 
Price Radius 
% of 
supply 
Price Radius 
% of 
supply 
Price 
0.005 43.4 12.0% 24.0 54.7 7.5% 15.1 54.7 22.6% 45.3 
0.0075 37.9 15.7% 20.9 47.8 9.9% 13.2 47.8 29.7% 39.6 
0.01 34.5 19.0% 19.0 43.4 12.0% 12.0 43.4 35.9% 35.9 
0.015 30.1 24.9% 16.6 37.9 15.8% 10.5 37.9 47.1% 31.4 
0.02 27.3 30.2% 15.1 34.5 19.0% 9.5 34.5 57.1% 28.5 
0.03 23.9 39.6% 13.2 30.1 24.9% 8.3 30.1 74.8% 24.9 
0.04 21.7 47.9% 12.0 27.4 30.2% 7.5 27.4 90.6% 22.6 
0.05 20.2 55.6% 11.1 25.4 35.0% 7.0 25.4 100% 21.0 
Notes: 1. Collection radius is 15 miles when participation rate is 100%.  
            2. Participation rate for supplier delivery indicates the maximum value in the collection 
area. 
 
        The simulation results show that optimal collection price and collection radius are 
decreasing with the increase in suppliers’ responses to price change. This table also provides 
evidence that the optimal collection radius between the processor collection and supplier 
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delivery are the same. Giving a 15% of land with this feedstock will participate and assuming 
that the processor is optimizing and knows the response rate, our estimation for parameter b  
is 0.015 and the optimal collection radius is 38 miles. The collection radius under 100% 
participation is 15 miles. 
        Given the deterrent effect of processor collection and a preference on behalf of both 
parties to avoid bidding up the price paid for stover, it can be assumed that the entrant will 
select a plant location that is close to, but not overlapping with the incumbent. Once all suitable 
locations have been used, any additional expansion will come from processors who increase 
capacity and supplier participation within their original draw area. In fact, the cost increase for 
entrant when the incumbent use processor collection is represented by 
21/22 2
3/22 22
4 2 4
Q tdQ t Q tdQQ
bd b bd
  + − = −       
. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Collection cost increase as the distance between two processors change 
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        Given the same parameter used in simulation above, figure 2.1 below illustrates how the 
collection cost change as the distance between two processors change. It demonstrates a 
significant cost increase when competition exists. 
Marginal Cost for a Processor Expanding within an Existing Draw Area  
        As the mandate incentivizes additional production, competition for stover should ensure 
that all suitable locations are used. Further increases in ethanol produced from stover will 
therefore arise only if existing firms increase production from within the original draw area.  
        Figure 2.2 illustrates how costs increase as existing plants increase capacity, prices, and 
supplier participation within their original draw area. A doubling of capacity from 30 million 
gallons to 60 million gallons increases costs from $41.84 to $62.71—a 50% increase. Ogden 
and Anderson (2011) show that the marginal cost of ethanol made from agricultural residue 
rises from $2.80 per gallon of gasoline equivalent to $3.00 per gallon, at which time the 16 
billion mandate (equal to 10.5 billion gallons of gasoline equivalent) is met. Expanding beyond 
the mandate, Ogden and Anderson (2011) also show that perennial grasses enter the mix at a 
price range of $3.30 to $3.80 and that pulpwood enters at $3.60. At $3.50 per gallon, production 
doubles from approximate 10 billion gallons of gasoline equivalent to 20 billion gallons of 
gasoline equivalent. The 16.6% increase from the $3 to the $3.50 double production using 
other feedstocks is much lower than the 50% increase in costs for monopsonistic stover 
processors who double production. This suggests that these alternative feedstocks will be used.  
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Figure 2.2: Marginal cost when the collection radius is fixed 
2.4 Conclusion 
         The production of cellulosic energy involves bulky raw material, capital-intensive 
processing plants, and feedstock producers who are heterogeneous with respect to the price at 
which they are willing to sell raw material. These circumstances are very different to those that 
existed as the corn ethanol industry emerged. The first two commercial scale pilot plants have 
both shown a willingness to accept very large draw areas and low feedstock producer 
participation. They have also introduced a collection mechanism that relies on the use of plant-
owned equipment, this runs counter to the mechanism used in the grain industry where grain 
producers deliver to plants. Results presented in this article show that plants are behaving 
rationally given their monopsonistic status. Results also show that the use of a processor 
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collection mechanism is a deterrent to new plants who are considering siting a plant with a 
draw area that overlaps the incumbent plant. The intuition behind this is that under supplier 
delivery, feedstock producers at the edge of the draw area for plants are easily poached. Under 
processor collection, these producers can only be poached if the entrant enters into a costly 
price war with the incumbent. If entrants locate away from the draw area for incumbent plants, 
then these plants will retain their monopsonistic status and will be able to expand capacity only 
if they increase feedstock prices so as to expand participation among feedstock suppliers. 
Taken together these results suggest that it will not be possible to meet the cellulosic mandate 
with stover alone and that other feedstock sources will be required.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
CHAPTER 3. THE EXAMINATION OF MARKET POWER OF 
U.S. NITROGEN FERTILIZER INDUSTRY: A BAYESIAN 
BASED APPROACH 
Abstract 
         This paper investigates a change in the market power of the U.S. nitrogen fertilizer 
industry by examining the causal linkage between fertilizer, its main feedstock (natural gas), 
and output (corn) price from 1999 to 2011. A time-varying parameter model has been 
established in our analysis and estimation is done by a Bayesian-based Kalman filter algorithm. 
We also utilize a single-equation error correction model to determine if there is a long-run 
equilibrium price relationship when the co-integrating vector is no longer constant over time. 
The results of the time-varying estimation show that the U.S. nitrogen fertilizer price follows 
the value of its marginal productivity closer than its marginal cost of production, indicating a 
less competitive market structure. The estimation from the error correction model supports 
these results. 
3.1 Introduction 
        Nitrogen, phosphate, and potash play important roles in the ability of crops to develop 
proteins and enzymes, which in turn, help improve crop yields. Commercial fertilizer 
consumption increased rapidly before 1980 as more acreage was devoted to high-yield crop 
varieties and hybrids that responded favorably to more intensive fertilizer use. Since the mid-
1980’s, the consumption of phosphate and potash remains stable, while the consumption of 
nitrogen fertilizer has increased more rapidly due to the development of seed varieties with 
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more favorable yield responses to nitrogenous fertilizers. This increasing annual usage shows 
the importance of nitrogen fertilizer to U.S. agricultural production. In fact, U.S. farmers are 
moving away from using multiple-nutrient fertilizers toward using single-nutrient fertilizers or 
fertilizers with a high level of nutrient concentration. This is because single nutrient fertilizers 
with high nutrient concentration allow farmers to apply precise amounts of a specific nutrient 
for plant use at the least cost. Figure 3.1 shows that the annual usage for all types of nitrogen 
fertilizers has nearly quadrupled from 2.73 million tons to 12.84 million tons from 1960 to 
2011; whereas the annual usage of phosphate and potash has only increased roughly two-fold 
during the same period.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: U.S. consumption of nitrogen, phosphate, and potash 1960–2011. 
 
        In 2011, nitrogen fertilizer accounted for 59% of total U.S. agricultural nutrient usage. 
Thus, research on price behaviors and the market structure of U.S. nitrogen fertilizer industry 
is pertinent; and yet, literature on this field is very limited. 
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
  Nitrogen (N)  Phosphate (P2O5)    Potash (K2O)
63 
 
        Among all nitrogen fertilizer usage, corn production accounted for the largest share at 
over 45%. Figure 3.2 illustrates nitrogen use by main crops in the United States from 1964 to 
2010, and indicates increasing nitrogen use by corn and wheat during that time.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: U.S. plant nitrogen use by corn, soybeans, cotton, and wheat, 1964–2010 
 
        In this paper, we are interested in investigating the market competitiveness of nitrogen 
fertilizer industry. In a market that is uncompetitive, sellers are able to price their product 
depending on the buyer’s ability to pay. Thus, if the nitrogen fertilizer industry is 
uncompetitive, nitrogen fertilizer prices quoted by producers will be closely correlated with 
crop price—the key factor of a farmer’s ability to pay. In competitive markets such as grains 
and meat, output prices tend to revert to production costs in the long run. Under perfect 
competition circumstances, firms face perfectly elastic demand and have no power to increase 
prices higher than the industry marginal cost.  
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        Among all inputs used to produce nitrogen fertilizer, such as anhydrous ammonia and 
urea, natural gas is the single most important and accounts for the largest share of the cost 
structure. Depending on plant technology, 75% of total urea production cost is from natural 
gas, of which 25% is through direct use in the production process and 50% is through the use 
of ammonia as a feedstock, of which natural gas is also the most important cost component. 
This cost structure implies that, under a competitive market and with all else being equal, urea 
price changes should follow closely to natural gas price changes. However, figure 3.3 shows 
that natural gas prices have fallen to historically low levels since early 2009, due to the latest 
discovery of shell-rock natural gas reserves in the United States and improved technology to 
ensure a sustainable supply, while urea prices have increased after a sharp decrease in 2008. 
In fact, urea price follows closer to corn prices, both of which have increased in recent years. 
 
 
Figure 3.3:  Monthly price of urea, natural gas, corn and % of capacity utilization 
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        Another way to look at the problem is though the correlation coefficients between the 
mentioned price variables. We analyze the period 1999-2011 in two sub-periods, one from 
1999 to 2005 and the other from 2006 to 2011 (Galbraith 2010). As table 3.1 shows, in the first 
period we observe a strong correlation between urea and natural gas prices and a weak 
correlation between urea and corn. The picture is exactly the opposite between 2006 and 2011; 
a very weak correlation of urea with respect to its own and main feedstock, but strong with one 
of its main demand factors. 
Table 3.1: Correlation coefficients between urea, natural gas and corn 
Period 1999-2005 Period 2006-2011 
  
Natural 
Gas Corn Urea  
Natural 
Gas Corn Urea 
Natural 
Gas 1.0     
Natural 
Gas 1.0   
Corn 0.3 1.0   Corn -0.1 1.0  
Urea 0.8 0.3 1.0 Urea 0.4 0.6 1.0 
 
        Natural gas is also the main feedstock of ammonia and it accounts for about 85% of the 
total production cost. In this regard, ammonia price should follow natural gas even closer than 
urea. Yet, figure 3.4 shows that since 2009, ammonia price has increased and natural gas prices 
have decreased. The increasing corn price in the same time indicates that ammonia price is 
closer to corn price (a factor determine farmer’s ability to pay) than to its main feedstock price. 
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Figure 3.4: Monthly price of ammonia, natural gas, corn and % of capacity utilization 
 
        Table 3.2 compares the correlation coefficients between these commodities. There is 
positive correlation of 0.5 between natural gas and ammonia prices between 1999 and 2005, 
similar to that with respect to corn prices. However, from 2006 to 2011 we observe no 
correlation between ammonia and natural gas, but an increased correlation of 0.7 with corn. 
Table 3.2: Correlation coefficients between ammonia, natural gas and corn 
Period 1999-2005 Period 2006-2011 
  
Natural 
Gas Corn Ammonia  
Natural 
Gas Corn Ammonia 
Natural 
Gas 1.0     
Natural 
Gas 1.0   
Corn 0.3 1.0   Corn -0.1 1.0  
Ammonia 0.5 0.5 1.0 Ammonia 0.0 0.7 1.0 
 
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
1.10
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
%
 C
ap
ac
ity
 U
til
iza
tio
n
$/
M
T
Ammonia (farm-level) Corn Natural Gas Ammonia (Capac. Util.)
67 
 
        One of the key purposes of this study is to analyze the competitiveness of the U.S. nitrogen 
fertilizer industry to determine whether the prices of nitrogen fertilizer, such as anhydrous 
ammonia and urea, follow the marginal cost of production (the competitive case) or the value 
of the marginal productivity of fertilizers in agriculture (the non-competitive case). The co-
integration and vector error correction model (VECM) introduced by Granger (1981) and 
Engle and Granger (1987) has been the most widely used methodology to analyze long-run 
price causality. Our results, however, demonstrate an unstable causal relationship between 
nitrogen fertilizer price and its feedstock (natural gas) or output (corn) price over the sample 
period. This non-constancy of causality makes the application of standard Granger causality 
test inappropriate. In this paper, we investigate the time-varying effects of natural gas prices 
and corn prices on U.S. nitrogen fertilizer prices from 1999 to 2011 by using a Bayesian-based 
time-varying parameter approach. 
        In understanding the market power of the U.S. nitrogen fertilizer industry, the role played 
by capacity utilization cannot be overlooked. The capacity constraint on nitrogen production 
is a significant factor that affects the price-cost margin (a fundamental way to characterize 
market power of an industry) of the nitrogen industry in the short term. Nitrogen demand is 
quite inelastic since farmers must use a certain amount to enhance crop yields. Thus, even a 
small firm with available production capacity can earn great market power if market demand 
is greater than industry capacity and supplies of other firms are close to their individual 
capacity. However, the market power caused by this capacity constraint cannot be maintained 
with the capacity expansion in the medium term and long term.  
        We observe in figure 3.3 that, in the case of urea, capacity utilization oscillates around 
83% from 1999 to 2005, and has decreased since 2006. Figure 3.4 shows that ammonia 
68 
 
capacity utilization has also decreased steadily since 2006. These observations in decreasing 
capacity utilization might be an indication of increasing market power in the U.S. fertilizer 
industry since a non-competitive industry has the incentive to exert its market power and 
underutilize its capacity in order to increase output price. Thus, the second contribution of this 
paper is to take into account the industry capacity utilization into an original price formulation 
model to analyze how the interrelation between different factors affect nitrogen fertilizer 
prices. 
        The last contribution of this paper is to utilize a single-equation error correction model to 
analyze both long-run and short-run adjustments to equilibrium relationship by constructing 
an error correction term in which a co-integrating vector is no longer constant as in the standard 
model, but instead time-varying estimates. 
        The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 summarizes the literature review. Section 3.3 
explains the methodology employed. Section 3.4 provides an empirical analysis, including data 
description and empirical results. Section 3.4 also exhibits the time-varying relationship 
between different nitrogen feedstock and product prices and fertilizer prices via a Bayesian-
based Kalman filter and the estimation of a single-equation error correction model. Section 3.5 
offers concluding remarks. 
3.2 Related Literature 
        There have been very limited academic studies on the price behavior and market power 
of the U.S. nitrogen fertilizer industry. Huang (2007) analyzes the impacts of rising natural gas 
prices on U.S. ammonia price and supply and finds that further increases in natural gas prices 
in the United States would result in a continuous decrease in U.S. aggregate ammonia supply 
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that could make U.S. ammonia markets more vulnerable. Galbraith (2010) compares price 
variations of urea and ammonia in North American locations to that of natural gas and corn 
using an error correction model in two different periods: 2002–2005 and 2006–2009. He finds 
that fertilizer prices respond more to natural gas prices in the first period and corn prices in the 
second period. The main pitfall of this analysis is that it tested each factor individually, not 
accounting for the correlation between them. Humber (2014) utilizes a structural vector 
autoregressive (SVAR) model to determine the impact the 2010 merger between CF industries 
and Terra industries had on fertilizer prices. The counterfactual fertilizer prices generated 
suggest a 75% increase in fertilizer prices caused by the merger. 
        Carter and Kohn (1994) provide an algorithm to carry out Bayesian inference on a linear-
state space model, in which states are generated efficiently using the Kalman filter. Frühwirth-
Schnatter (1994) suggest a data augmentation algorithm to approximate posterior distribution 
and model likelihoods for a dynamic linear model. Jong and Shephard (1995) introduce a 
simulation smother, which draws from the multivariate posterior distribution of the disturbance 
of the model. Durbin and Koopman (2002) present a simpler and more efficient simulation 
smoother relative to that of Jong and Shephard (1995), in which only mean corrections for 
unconditional vectors are required. Petris et al. (2009) formally introduce the Bayesian-based 
Kalman filter, the state space model and dynamic linear model, as well as the procedure for 
estimating and forecasting. Koop et al. (2011) introduces a Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) algorithm that allows Bayesian inference in a time-varying co-integration model and 
combines the simulation smoother for state-space time-series models and the Gibbs sampling 
method for time-invariant VECM.  
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        Empirically, both error correction models and time-varying parameter (TVP) models have 
been increasingly used in many fields of study. Hung-Gay Fung et al. (2013) use the daily data 
of 16 commodity futures contracts traded in China and the corresponding foreign markets to 
analyze price linkage between markets. Their results show that no significant causal relation 
was found in most of futures pairs. Arslanturk et al. (2011) use the rolling window and time-
varying parameter estimation methods to analyze the Granger causality between tourism 
receipts and economic growth in a small open economy. Park et al. (2010) estimateU.S. 
gasoline demand from 1976 to 2008 using a time-varying co-integrating regression method. 
Balcilar et al. (2015) analyze the time-varying causality between spot and futures crude oil 
prices via a Markov-switching vector-error correction model, and find that the lead-lag 
relationship between the spot and futures oil markets existed only temporarily. 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Model Specification 
        The standard invariant-parameter Granger causality test in section 4 demonstrates that 
nitrogen fertilizer prices are co-integrated with natural gas prices in the pre-2006 sub-period; 
however, they are co-integrated with corn prices in the post-2006 sub-period. There is no 
Granger causal relationship between fertilizer prices and corn price or natural gas price in the 
full sample range. This implies an unstable causal relationship over the sample period, and the 
examination of time-varying relationship between fertilizer, corn, and natural gas prices is of 
interest. 
        Consider a model in which nitrogen fertilizer price is determined by both demand side 
force and supply side force for the given capacity utilization: 
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                                                 price= (demand, supply, capacity)f                                               (3.1) 
Natural gas accounts for 75% and 85% of total production cost of urea and ammonia, 
respectively; thus, its price would be one of the most influential factors that affects nitrogen 
fertilizer price. Accordingly, natural gas prices are selected as the proxy variable for demand 
side force of the price system. Corn price is selected as the proxy variable for the supply side 
force of the price system since corn accounted for the largest share of nitrogen use among 
crops. 
       Consider a regression model in which coefficients are time varying rather than fixed: 
            (1) (2) (3) (4) 2,  (0, )t t t t t t t t t tFertilizer Corn Gas Capacity N εβ β β β ε ε σ= + + + +             (3.2)      
where tFertilizer , tCorn and tGas  are the monthly prices of nitrogen fertilizer, corn, and natural 
gas after a natural logarithm, respectively, and tCapacity  is the fertilizer capacity utilization 
rate at time t .  
        (1)tβ ,
(2)
tβ ,
(3)
tβ  and 
(4)
tβ are time-varying parameters treated as stochastic state variables, 
for which the transition equation follows random walk with trends: 
                                              
(1) (1) (1) (1)
1 1
(2) (2) (2) (2)
1 1
(3) (3) (3) (3)
1 1
(4) (4) (4) (4)
1 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
t t t t
t t t t
t t t t
t t t t
v
v
v
v
β α β
β α β
β α β
β α β
− −
− −
− −
− −
        
        
        = + +        
                       
                           (3.3)  
where (1)tα ,
(2)
tα ,
(3)
tα  and 
(4)
tα are possible time trends, which satisfies the random walk 
assumption: 
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                                      (3.4) 
All random error terms are assumed to be identically and independently normal distributed: 
( ) 2
,(0, )
i
t i vNν σ  for 1, 2,3, 4i =  and 
( ) 2
,(0, )
i
t i ww N σ  for 1, 2,3, 4i = . This I.I.D. random walk 
assumption is flexible and can be modified to impose more restrictions on the structure of the 
time variation. The time-varying parameter model characterized by equations (3.1) and (3.2) 
is in the form of dynamic linear model and can be estimated recursively from the updated 
information available at each time point t , by using a Bayesian–based Kalman filter algorithm.  
3.3.2 Estimation Method 
        In order to estimate the time-varying parameters, we apply a Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) method to sequentially obtain samples of parameters from undated posterior 
conditional distribution by Gibbs sampling. The model above can be rewritten as a dynamic 
linear model specified by a normal prior distribution of the 4- dimensional state vector at time 
0t = , 
 0 4 0 0~ ( , )N m Cβ   
together with a pair of equations for each time 1t ≥ , 
 
2
2 2 2 2
1 1 1, 2, 3, 4,
2 2 2 2
1 1, 2, 3, 4,
,   (0, )
,     (0, ( , , , ))
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−
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


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where ty  is the dependent variable, nitrogen fertilizer price. tX  is the vector that contains all 
explanatory variables, tβ  is a time-varying state vector with time trend tα  in its dynamic . We 
consider the commonly used inverse-gamma conjugate priors for the unknown variance of 
random errors.  More specifically, we assume the inverse of the variances 2εσ , 
2
1,vσ ,
2
2,vσ ,
2
3,vσ , 
2
4,vσ and 
2
1,wσ ,
2
2,wσ ,
2
3,wσ , 
2
4,wσ  have independent gamma prior with mean a  and variance b . 
Given the observations 1:Ty  and 1:TX , the conjugate posterior conditional distribution of 
unknown variances are given as:  
2
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Letting 1a b= =  and using the posterior conditional distribution of random errors, the forward 
filtering backward sampling (FFBS) procedure can be implemented by the following steps: 
1. Choose the initial value of the mean 0m  and distance from 0C  for the normal prior 
distribution of state vector at initiation time. 
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2. Draw initial value of 2εσ ,
2
1,vσ ,
2
2,vσ ,
2
3,vσ ,
2
4,vσ and 
2
1,wσ ,
2
2,wσ ,
2
3,wσ ,
2
4,wσ  from their independent 
and identical inverse gamma priors. 
3. Run Kalman filter and get sample of state variables via FFBS algorithm. 
4. Update information of state variables obtained in step 3 and draw samples of 2εσ ,
2
1,vσ ,
2
2,vσ ,
2
3,vσ ,
2
4,vσ and 
2
1,wσ ,
2
2,wσ ,
2
3,wσ ,
2
4,wσ  from their corresponding posterior inverse gamma 
distribution equation. 
5. Substitute the sample obtained in step 4 into step 2 as the initial values for  2εσ ,
2
1,vσ ,
2
2,vσ ,
2
3,vσ ,
2
4,vσ and 
2
1,wσ ,
2
2,wσ ,
2
3,wσ ,
2
4,wσ . 
6. Repeat steps 1 through 5 for M  times, obtaining a bootstrapped set of parameter estimates
 { }( , ) : 1,...,m mt t m Mα β = . 
       This parameter set enables us to construct a confidence interval for estimates and to 
analyze the interrelationship between prices. We run the algorithms a total of 40,000 times 
and discard the first 20,000 samples as the burn period, then use the subsequent sample to 
make a Bayesian inference about the parameters. 
3.4 Empirical Analysis 
3.4.1 Description of Data 
        The empirical analysis of this study is based on data for the period from January 1999 to 
December 2011 for a total of 156 observations. The Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) 
reports farm-level average monthly retail prices of urea and anhydrous ammonia.  Monthly 
natural gas spot price comes from the Henry Hub terminal in Louisiana, and standardized as 
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U.S. dollars per thousand cubic meters of gas. Corn price is obtained from Economic Research 
Service (ERS). All prices are converted to natural logarithms. Capacity utilization is calculated 
as the ratio between the fertilizer supply and the sum of individual plant capacity of all plants 
in the North America. Data for the supply of fertilizer products and plant capacity are obtained 
from International Fertilizer Industry Association (IFA) and International Fertilizer 
Development Center (IFDA), respectively. 
        To investigate the time-varying relationship between nitrogen fertilizer price and its main 
feedstock and product prices, we first perform the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and 
Phillip-Perron (PP) unit root tests to all price series in different sample periods in order to 
determine whether they are stationary or not. The results in table 3.3 indicate that all price 
series are non-stationary in levels, but stationary for the first difference.  
Table 3.3: ADF and PP unit root test 
 99-Jan to 05-Dec 06-Jan to 11-Dec 09-Jan to 11-Dec 
 ADF Test PP Test ADF Test PP Test ADF Test PP Test 
Urea 0.97 -1.22 0.00 -2.40 0.45 -1.69 
Urea∆  -5.65*** -6.83*** -5.95*** -4.79*** -8.01*** -7.59*** 
Ammonia 0.87 -1.01 0.75 -1.18 1.23 -1.11 
Ammonia∆  -3.43*** -4.50*** -6.95*** -8.60*** -7.34*** -10.91*** 
Corn 0.01 -2.12 1.12 -1.35 0.93 -0.75 
Corn∆  -5.03*** -5.72*** -4.95*** -7.41*** -6.99*** -9.72*** 
Gas 0.81 -1.84 -0.60 -1.49 0.08 -2.67* 
Gas∆  -6.00*** -7.36*** -5.74*** -8.78*** -8.42*** -11.53*** 
Note: (***), (**) and (*) represents stationary at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level 
76 
 
3.4.2 Model Estimation and Empirical Results 
        To determine whether nitrogen fertilizer prices follow the marginal cost of production 
(the competitive case) or follow the value of the marginal productivity of fertilizers in 
agriculture (the non-competitive case), we first check the co-integration relation between price 
series to perform a Granger causality analysis. Since the analysis in the introduction implies a 
structural change in the causal relationship over the time period, we split our data into pre-
2006 and post-2006 components and apply Johansen’s co-integration test in each sub-period. 
Table 3.4: Pair-wise Johansen co-integration test 
  Urea Ammonia 
  Corn Gas Corn Gas 
99-Jan to 05-Dec 
0r =  14.40 13.03 11.37 21.88** 
1r ≤  1.20 1.60 1.92 2.97 
06-Jan to 11-Dec 
0r =  24.06*** 13.37 17.41* 10.17 
1r ≤  1.50 1.78 3.71 1.89 
99-Jan to 11-Dec 
0r =  12.46 12.05 15.94 14.78 
1r ≤  0.86 4.53 0.67 3.59 
Note: (***), (**) and (*) represents co-integration at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level 
        Table 3.4 illustrates the maximum likelihood trace statistics (Johansen, 1991) of pair-wise 
Granger causality test in each sample component. Table 3.4 shows that both urea and ammonia 
prices are co-integrated with corn price in the post-2006 sample period, indicating a non-
competitive market structure in which fertilizer prices follow the value of its marginal 
productivity in agriculture; whereas ammonia price is co-integrated with natural gas price in 
the pre-2006 sample period, which is an indication of competitive market structure in which 
77 
 
fertilizer prices follow the marginal cost of production. In addition, the full sample test results 
demonstrate that there is no Granger causal relationship between fertilizer prices and corn price 
or natural gas price in the full sample range. 
        The results of the standard pair-wise Granger causality test in table 3.4 demonstrate an 
unstable causal relationship between nitrogen fertilizer price and its feedstock (natural gas) or 
output (corn) price over the sample period. This non-constancy of causality makes the 
application of standard Granger causality test inappropriate. Thus, we next investigate the 
time-varying effects of natural gas prices and corn prices on U.S. nitrogen fertilizer prices over 
the 1999–2011 sample period by using a Bayesian-based time-varying parameter approach.  
        The main advantage of this method is that it enables us to explore the structural change, 
when there is transition from one type causal relationship to another within the model, using 
information presented in the full sample. The rejection of the existence of a co-integrated 
relationship between nitrogen fertilizer price and its main feedstock or output price over the 
full sample period might be the result of structural changes in the long-run relationship that 
cannot be modelled explicitly by a traditional error correction model. Instead of splitting the 
sample into sub-periods according to pre-defined points, the time-varying parameter approach, 
which is based on a dynamic linear model, enables us to investigate the transitions of 
relationships between price series via full sample data information.  
        The critical issue for Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods in applications is 
how to determine when it is safe to stop sampling and use the samples to estimate 
characteristics of the distribution of interest. This paper applies Gelman and Rubin’s 
convergence diagnostic on all posterior draws of parameters to ensure the convergence of 
MCMC items. The test result in table 3.5 demonstrates the evolution of Gelman and Rubin’s 
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shrink factor as the number of iterations increases for posterior draws of parameters (2)tβ , 
(3)
tβ  
and (4)tβ . These parameters characterize the time varying effect on nitrogen fertilizer prices. 
The evolutions for all impact parameters are close to 1, indicating convergence of these 
posterior draws. 
Table 3.5: MCMC convergence test 
Impact of Corn on Urea Impact of Gas on Urea Impact of Capacity on 
Urea 
   
Impact of Corn on AA Impact of Gas on AA Impact of Capacity on AA 
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         The impacts of corn price, natural gas price and capacity utilization on nitrogen fertilizer 
price are characterized by (2)tβ , 
(3)
tβ  and 
(4)
tβ , respectively. The corresponding time trends are 
characterized by the evolution of (2)tα ,
(3)
tα  and 
(4)
tα . Figure 3.5 shows posterior mean of 
estimation results of (2)tα ,
(3)
tα  and 
(4)
tα in ammonia equation. The posterior means of 
(2)
tα and 
(3)
tα are always close to zero, indicating no time trend of corn and natural gas price effect on 
ammonia price. But there is obvious downward trending for capacity utilization effect on 
ammonia price. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Time trend of effects on ammonia price 
 
        Similarly, figure 3.6 illustrates posterior mean of estimation results of (2)tα ,
(3)
tα  and 
(4)
tα
in urea equation. There is no time trend of corn price effect on urea price as the posterior mean 
of (2)tα varies around zero. The natural gas price effect on urea price experiences slightly 
increasing trend, while the time trend of capacity utilization effect on ammonia price is 
significantly downward sloping. 
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
Ja
n-
99
Ju
l-9
9
Ja
n-
00
Ju
l-0
0
Ja
n-
01
Ju
l-0
1
Ja
n-
02
Ju
l-0
2
Ja
n-
03
Ju
l-0
3
Ja
n-
04
Ju
l-0
4
Ja
n-
05
Ju
l-0
5
Ja
n-
06
Ju
l-0
6
Ja
n-
07
Ju
l-0
7
Ja
n-
08
Ju
l-0
8
Ja
n-
09
Ju
l-0
9
Ja
n-
10
Ju
l-1
0
Ja
n-
11
Ju
l-1
1
Time Trend of Corn Price Effect Time Trend of Gas Price Effect Time Trend of Capacity Utilization Effect
80 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Time trend of effects on urea price 
 
        Taking into account these time trends for the time varying effect on ammonia and urea 
prices, the de-trended estimation results of parameter (2)tβ , 
(3)
tβ  and 
(4)
tβ in each equation are 
illustrated from figure 3.7 to 3.12. 
         
 
Figure 3.7: Impact of corn price on ammonia price 
 
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Ja
n-
99
Ju
l-9
9
Ja
n-
00
Ju
l-0
0
Ja
n-
01
Ju
l-0
1
Ja
n-
02
Ju
l-0
2
Ja
n-
03
Ju
l-0
3
Ja
n-
04
Ju
l-0
4
Ja
n-
05
Ju
l-0
5
Ja
n-
06
Ju
l-0
6
Ja
n-
07
Ju
l-0
7
Ja
n-
08
Ju
l-0
8
Ja
n-
09
Ju
l-0
9
Ja
n-
10
Ju
l-1
0
Ja
n-
11
Ju
l-1
1
Time Trend of Corn Price Effect Time Trend of Gas Price Effect Time Trend of Capacity Utilization Effect
0.66
0.68
0.7
0.72
0.74
0.76
0.78
0.8
0.82
0.84
0.86
0.88
Ja
n-
99
Ju
l-9
9
Ja
n-
00
Ju
l-0
0
Ja
n-
01
Ju
l-0
1
Ja
n-
02
Ju
l-0
2
Ja
n-
03
Ju
l-0
3
Ja
n-
04
Ju
l-0
4
Ja
n-
05
Ju
l-0
5
Ja
n-
06
Ju
l-0
6
Ja
n-
07
Ju
l-0
7
Ja
n-
08
Ju
l-0
8
Ja
n-
09
Ju
l-0
9
Ja
n-
10
Ju
l-1
0
Ja
n-
11
Ju
l-1
1
81 
 
        Figure 3.7 illustrates the de-trended posterior mean of time-varying estimations on the 
impact of corn price on ammonia price. It shows that the effect of corn prices on ammonia 
prices has increased over time—the estimated coefficient increased from 0.739 to 0.817 over 
the sample period with a peak of 0.861.  
        Figure 3.8 shows de-trended estimation of the time-varying posterior mean impact of 
natural gas prices on ammonia prices when considering the effect of capacity utilization. It 
shows a decreasing trend of the estimated effects of natural gas prices on ammonia prices—
the coefficient decreased from 0.359 to 0.273 over the sample period with a trough of 0.184.  
 
 
Figure 3.8: Impact of natural gas price on ammonia price 
 
        Both the increasing effect of corn price on ammonia price demonstrated in figure 3.7 and 
the declining effect of natural gas price on ammonia price demonstrated in figure 3.8 indicate 
that nitrogen fertilizer prices have been following more closely to the value of marginal 
productivity rather than marginal cost of production, implying a stronger market power within 
the fertilizer industry over time. In addition, the posterior mean effect of capacity utilization 
on ammonia price in figure 3.9 provides another support to the increasing market power in 
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ammonia market. It illustrates steady increasing impact of ammonia capacity utilization on its 
price. In an uncompetitive market, supplier tends to restrict its capacity utilization to lower 
quantity and increase price-cost margin. Thus, the higher impact of capacity utilization on 
prices, the higher market power caused by this capacity constraint. 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Impact of capacity utilization on ammonia price 
 
        Turn to the model of urea price, figure 3.10 shows the de-trended posterior mean of time-
varying impact of corn prices on urea prices, when considering the effect of capacity 
utilization. After removing the effect of time trend, it still shows a convincing increasing 
impact of corn prices on urea prices over time, maintaining a high level in recent years. The 
time-varying estimated coefficient increased steadily from 0.363 to a peak of 0.653, and 
remained in a range between 0.539 and 0.653 since December, 2008. 
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Figure 3.10: Impact of corn price on urea price 
 
        Figure 3.11 illustrates the de-trended estimation of the time-varying posterior mean 
impact of natural gas prices on urea prices when considering the effect of capacity utilization. 
It shows that the impact of natural gas prices on urea prices have been oscillating from around 
0.20 from 1999 to mid-2008, then dropping below that level to the trough of 0.124 and 
increasing very slowly since year 2011.   
 
 
        Figure 3.11: Impact of natural gas price on urea price 
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        Both the increasing posterior mean effect of corn price on urea price demonstrated in 
figure 3.10 and the declining posterior mean effect of natural gas price on urea price 
demonstrated in figure 3.11 indicate that nitrogen fertilizer prices have been following more 
closely to the value of marginal productivity rather than marginal cost of production, implying 
a stronger market power within the urea industry over time. Again, the posterior mean effect 
of capacity utilization on urea price in figure 3.12 provides another support to the increasing 
market power in urea market. It illustrates steady increasing impact of urea capacity utilization 
on its price. This strong impact of capacity utilization on commodity prices indicates an 
increasing market power in urea market. 
 
 
Figure 3.12: Impact of capacity utilization on urea price 
 
        In summary, the estimation results of the time-varying parameter model for both ammonia 
and urea prices demonstrate an increasing effect of corn prices on nitrogen fertilizer prices over 
the years and a decreasing effect of natural gas on nitrogen fertilizer prices. This variation in 
causal relations coincides with the increasing impact of capacity utilization of the industry on 
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its commodity price. These time-varying changes in price causal relationships can be explained 
by the increasing degree of the non-competitive market structure in the U.S. nitrogen fertilizer 
industry—its market concentration index, one measurement of market power, has also 
increased steadily in recent years.6 
3.4.3 Single-Equation Error Correction Model 
        The standard invariant parameter Granger causality test performed in section 3.2 
demonstrated that there is no co-integration relationship between nitrogen fertilizer price and 
its main feedstock and output price over the full sample period. The co-integrating vector 
remains constant over time in a standard co-integration model, but the results in section 3.2 
show that the relationships between fertilizer prices and corn and natural gas prices are varied 
over time. As a result, the long-run equilibrium relationship between price series cannot be 
explained by the model with a constant co-integrating vector, since it is impossible to take into 
account the structural change in the model appropriately.  
        The next thing we are interested in examining is whether there is a long-run equilibrium 
relationship between fertilizer price and the price of its demand and supply factors. We utilize 
the single-equation error correction model (SSECM) to examine the long-run relationship 
between these three components. In our model, the error correction term is obtained from the 
Bayesian estimates of the time-varying regression model and can be represented as 
                                                 
6 For urea, the 4-firm concentration index has increased from 68% to 84% over the sample period; 
and the 4-firm concentration index of the ammonia industry has increased from 48% to 77% over 
sample period. 
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    
(1) (2) (3) (4)
t t t tt t t t tECT Fertilizer Corn Gas Capacityβ β β β= − − − −   
where 
( )
,  1, 2,3, 4
i
t iβ =  are estimates from the time-varying regression model in equation (3.2);
tFertilizer , tCorn and tGas  are monthly prices of nitrogen fertilizer, corn, and natural gas, 
respectively, and tCapacity  is the fertilizer capacity utilization rate at time t . The error 
correction model is expressed as  
 0 1 1 2 3t t t t tFertilizer ECT Corn Gasφ φ φ φ ε−∆ = + + ∆ + ∆ +   
where 1φ  characterizes the long-run adjustment between the three price series back to their 
long-run equilibrium relationship, 2φ  and 3φ measure the short-run adjustment of corn and 
natural gas price changes on fertilizer price. 
Table 3.6: Results of error correction model 
Variables Model 1 (Urea) Model 2 (AA) 
Constant 0.0097 
-24.8005*** 
0.2885** 
0.1202** 
0.0081* 
-20.2709*** 
0.1972** 
0.1327*** 
1tECT −  
tCorn∆  
tGas∆  
Note: (***), (**) and (*) represents significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
 
        The estimation results are reported in table 3.6. First, all coefficients are significant at the 
5% level, except the constant term in the model, indicating a good explanation of this error 
correction model. Second, the estimated coefficients of the error correction term are both 
negative and significant, which is an indication of the existence of a co-integrated relationship. 
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Third, the coefficient of corn price changes is significantly larger than that of natural gas price 
changes, indicating a greater impact of corn price on fertilizer price. This supports the results 
we obtained in section 3.2 by using the time-varying parameter model. 
3.5 Conclusion 
        This paper utilizes a time-varying parameter approach to analyze the price causal 
relationship between U.S. nitrogen fertilizer and its main feedstock and crop product, while 
considering capacity utilization of the industry. Our empirical results from the time-varying 
parameter approach show that the price of corn, the largest share of nitrogen use, has become 
more influential in affecting nitrogen fertilizer price over the years, while the effect of natural 
gas, the main feedstock of nitrogen fertilizer production, has been decreasing in recent years. 
Combining this result with increasing market concentration and decreasing capacity 
utilization, we conclude that the degree of non-competitiveness in the U.S. nitrogen fertilizer 
industry has increased over the years. The analysis of a long-run and short-run adjustment to 
the equilibrium relationship from the error correction model provides support for our 
conclusion.  
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